Brooklyn Law School

BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship

2006

Keep It Simple: An Explanation of the Rule of No
Recovery for Pure Economic Loss
Anita Bernstein
Brooklyn Law School, anita.bernstein@brooklaw.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Legal Remedies Commons, Other Law Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons
Recommended Citation
48 Ariz. L. Rev. 773 (2006)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.

KEEP IT SIMPLE: AN EXPLANATION OF
THE RULE OF No RECOVERY FOR

PURE ECONOMIC Loss
Anita Bernstein*

INTRODUCTION
Here is the problem, as a prominent casebook presents it. In one group of
cases alleging accidental harm, "[t]he defendant is by hypothesis negligent; the
plaintiffs harm is typically foreseeable, even if the precise identity of the plaintiff
is not; there are rarely any intervening acts or events sufficient to sever the causal
connection; and typically there are no affirmative defenses based on the plaintiffs
misconduct."' So much compliance with the demands of negligence doctrine in
this group notwithstanding, courts almost uniformly deny plaintiffs compensation
for their consequential or "pure" economic loss. When economic-loss plaintiffs
cannot connect physical injury or property damage to the acts or omissions of
defendants, judges will kick these plaintiffs out of court. Why?

*
Sam Nunn Professor of Law, Emory University, and Wallace Stevens
Professor of Law, New York Law School. This Article is a revised version of a paper
originally written for presentation at the Dan B. Dobbs Conference on Economic Tort Law
hosted by the University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law in Tucson, Arizona,
on March 3-4, 2006. Articles from the Conference are collected in this issue, Volume 48
Number 4, of the Arizona Law Review. I acknowledge with gratitude the scholarship of Dan
Dobbs and the leadership of Ellen Bublick that came together to create this Conference.
Participants at workshops at Brooklyn, Emory, and Lewis and Clark law schools honed my
thesis. Marc Miller, Tony Sebok, Bobby Ahdieh, Bob Rabin, and Ted Janger gave eyeopening comments. All the mistakes that remain, I own.
1.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1166 (8th ed. 2004).
I have never found a better statement of the problem. See Anita Bernstein, The
Representational Dialectic (With Illustrationsfrom Obscenity, Forfeiture, and Accident
Law), 87 CAL. L. REv. 305, 341-42 (1999) [hereinafter Bernstein, Representational
Dialectic] (quoting the formulation from an earlier edition of this casebook). Epstein talks
about economic loss that results from negligent rather than intentional conduct, and I do the
same in this Article, as does the current draft of the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (THiRD)

OF TORTS: ECON. TORTS & RELATED WRONGS (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2006) (including

blackletter under Part I, Introduction; and Part II, Unintentional Injury, while reserving for
future rounds Parts III through V, on intentional wrongs that cause economic loss).
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A question as fundamental as this one ought to come with either a quick,
convincing, widely shared answer or an extensive literature plumbing its
mysteries. The tort rule on pure economic loss offers neither satisfaction. Whereas
outside the United States, especially in Europe and Canada, this topic is as wellcovered as any in torts, pure economic loss "remains a backwater within the
discourse of American tort law.", 2 The rule never got its own blackletter section in
Restatement (Second) of Torts,3 and commentators have never agreed on how to
classify the cases that fall within its ambit. They even disagree on what to call the
rule.4
The literature does contain a few attempts to justify the rule of no
recovery, helpfully gathered by Mark Gergen, reporter for the American Law
Institute's Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Loss. Professor
Gergen encountered five rationales. 5 The first rationale is to protect against
liability for "incalculable losses." 6 The second, associated with law and
economics, is that economic losses "are not social losses."7 For a third rationale,
Gergen invokes the Canadian torts scholar Bruce Feldthusen: "People are more
important than money." 8 The fourth rationale: Courts that reject claims for pure
economic loss are trying to "[e]ncourage private ordering." 9 Fifth, courts that
follow the rule are "preserving the priority of contract law" and related doctrines,
including "restitution and equity," which deserve deference for being
"more
0
determinate and more supportive of private ordering than accident law."'
If one were harsh, one might quote the sneer attributed to the physicist
Wolfgang Pauli: These five standard rationales for the economic loss rule appear
"not even wrong."" The first of them, sometimes called in metaphoric shorthand

2.
Gary T. Schwartz, American Tort Law and the (Supposed) Economic Loss
Rule, in PuRE ECONOMIC Loss rN EUROPE 94, 96 (Mauro Bussani & Vernon Valentine

Palmer eds., 2003).
3.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF TORTS:

LIAB. FOR ECON. Loss

16-17

(Preliminary Draft No. 1, 2005) (summarizing scattered, "cryptic" treatment of the topic in
the Restatement (Second)).
4.
Commentators outside the United States sometimes use "the exclusionary
rule," which in the United States is often reserved for criminal procedure and has no home
in private litigation. In this Article, I try to stick to "the economic loss rule" or "economic
loss," usually unmodified by "pure." See also infra notes 42-43, 157 and accompanying
text (questioning whether a true "rule" really exists).
5.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. Loss 15 (Preliminary
Draft No. 1, 2005) (noting that the fifth rationale "ties into" the fourth, which in turn "ties
into" the first three). The Gergen list was revised and redacted in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: ECON. TORTS & RELATED WRONGS § 8 cmt. b (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2006).
6.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECON. TORTS & RELATED WRONGS 14

(Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2006).
7.
Id.

8.

Id.
at 15 (citing BRUCE

FELDTHUSEN,

ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE 12 (4th ed.

2000)).
9.
10.
11.
Pauli may in

Id.
Id.
The mathematician Peter Woit has made extended use of this phrase (which
fact never have said), maintaining a blog called "Not Even Wrong." Woit is
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"the floodgates," applies to only some claims for economic loss. American case
law is full of economic-loss plaintiffs who were able to state with precision what
they lost, to no avail.' 2 Perhaps they lacked a theory of why another hypothetical
group of plaintiffs should not recover, but such a labor of exclusion was not their
job. Many observers and participants in the American tort system would reject the
premise of the second rationale-that only those losses that economists would
recognize as "social losses" should be remedied. Even if this point were
universally acknowledged, economic losses at least sometimes are social losses, as
several writers from the law and economics camp have explained. 13 That "people
are more important than money" does not tell us why courts find damage to
tangible property compensable.1 4 In sum, the first three rationales are overbroad, if
not fatuous. The fourth and fifth rationales say basically the same thing: Other
areas of law-contract, restitution, equity-are superior to accident law, and
economic-loss plaintiffs are losers for having failed to embrace the private
ordering that these other areas present.
Getting warm, I think. The first draft Restatement led off with "the most
commonly stated reason for the rule,"' 5 but this first rationale, popular though it
may be, is vapid. The list grows more compelling with each entry. It never
becomes completely convincing, even at the end: Some economic-loss plaintiffs
never could have achieved private ordering with the defendant yet lose anyway.
Furthermore, when these last two rationales are overapplied-perhaps even when
also the author of NOT EVEN WRONG: THE FAILURE OF STRING THEORY
CONTINUING CHALLENGE TO UNIFY THE LAWS OF PHYSICS (2006).

AND THE

12.
See Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss:
A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513, 1525 (1985) ("Lost profits, wages, and other
monetary expectancies involve assessments of tangible value that have been entertained on
countless occasions in contract and property disputes."); Eileen Silverstein, On Recovery in
Tort for Pure Economic Loss, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 412 (1999) (wondering why
one court that had expressed concern about the floodgates "did not pause to address the
consequences of denying recovery to the single plaintiff who alone claimed that the
[claimed breach of duty] caused provable damages with reasonable certainty"). Silverstein
goes on to argue that economic losses are much more determinate and less speculative than
damages for pain and suffering related to physical injury. Id.at 423.
13.

See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 136 (1987)

(stating that some economic loss claims do involve losses of "social welfare"); Russell
Brown, Still Crazy After All These Years: Arms, Cooper v. Hobart and Pure Economic Loss,

36 U. BRIT. COLUMBIA L. REV. 159, 161 n.8 (2003) (claiming that the "no social losses"

hypothesis rests on "a dubious assumption of excess capacity"); Mario J. Rizzo, The
Economic Loss Problem: A Comment on Bishop, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 197, 201-04

(1982) (offering extended critique).
14.
See Richard L. Abel, Should Tort Law ProtectProperty Against Accidental
Loss?, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79 (1986) (answering "no" to this question). It is possible to

cobble together a response: for example, one scholar has suggested that "human values"
support ranking "tangible property" above "intangible wealth" in the hierarchy of
compensable interests. TONY WEIR, A CASEBOOK ON TORT 6 (9th ed. 2000). But this third

rationale does not say why money cannot be deemed worth something, even if it is at the
bottom of a hierarchy.
15.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. Loss 15 (Preliminary

Draft No. 1, 2005).

776

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 48:773

they are taken at face value-they deny most of modem products liability, starting
with the famous Fall of the Citadel that set plaintiffs free from privity.' 6 Flaws and
all, the Restatement crescendo-no recovery for pure economic loss because tort
law should defer to better law (doctrines "more determinate and more supportive
of private ordering")-presents the beginning of an answer to our question, which
I state here as Keep It Simple.
Whereas most areas of legal doctrine have over time moved toward more
complexity-codification, statutes, regulations, loopholes, exceptions, procedural
tangles-tort still aligns its rules with the intuitions and stances of ordinary people.
American tort law puts "ordinary" into a rule, 7 refers whenever possible to
"reasonable" actors,' insists that persons enjoy a right of access qua litigants to
the courts,' 9 and (in particular contrast to other areas of private law, including
contract law) regards litigants with a warmth to which an average person can
relate: Few other fields make law about the emotional ties between parents and
children, intimate relations that husbands share with wives, or the range of awful
feelings that human beings experience: fear, shock, apprehension of imminent
harmful contact, severe emotional distress, chagrin at having their privacy invaded.
Empowering the civil jury, tort law celebrates a bastion of homespun
20
inexpertise°
-and does so uniquely: Unlike litigants in the criminal justice
system, who face strong pressure to waive their jury-trial rights in the form of both
pretrial incentives to plead guilty and augmented sentences following conviction
should they refuse to plead, tort plaintiffs can still contemplate settlement offers

16.

William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),

50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 793

(1966).

17.
From the start, modem negligence law refused to delineate the obligations of
this type of care ex ante, thereby emphasizing the power of nonexpert individuals to
determine how cases would come out. See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 296
(1850) ("[W]hat constitutes ordinary care will vary with the circumstances of cases.").
18.
See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 277 (2000) (outlining "the
objective reasonable person standard"). In addition to evaluating individuals' behavior
under a reasonable person standard, tort law also gives "reasonable" a procedural meaning
in its standards for dismissal, summary judgment, and directed verdict: A judge ought to
take a plaintiff's case from a jury if "reasonable people could not accept it as sufficient to
prove the plaintiffs case." Id. at 355.
19.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; John C.P. Goldberg, The ConstitutionalStatus
of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J.
526 (2005). State constitutions frequently contain "equal access" or "open courts"
provisions as well.
20.
In conversations with me Robert Rabin has expressed disagreement: Tort law
is full of complexity, he argues, giving as examples toxic torts, claims of design defect, and
questions of causation that call for knowledge of arcana like engineering or pharmacology.
Personal injury claims, especially ones that reach juries, often do contain complexity. Tort
adjudication keeps them simple not by denying the mechanics of harm, which can be
infinitely complex, but by asking and answering questions at a basic level: What injury did
the plaintiff experience? Did X act as a reasonable person? Who should win, the plaintiff or
the defendant? Tort law makes complicated past events simpler to fit them into questions
like these. Expert witnesses and summary judgment memoranda, which to Rabin exemplify
complexity, also function as simplifiers.
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21
free from rules that punish them for rejecting deals and going before a jury.
American fee rules permit contingent financing in tort cases, a measure they
prohibit in criminal litigation,2 2 which helps litigants of modest income to acquire
their own panel of lay decisionmakers. Compensation schemes, expert tribunals,
and statutory immunities to replace or thwart jury-focused personal injury
litigation (such as the federal law enacted in 2005 that protects gun manufacturers
from some lawsuits 23) remain rare.

If one takes this orientation as given, it follows that in the United States
tort rules will be relatively accessible to average citizens, more so than rules in
other areas. The fogs that generate income for specialist counselors in fields like
antitrust, trusts and estates, corporate governance and business planning,
environmental law, and tax law become obstructions in a subject built to anticipate
a jury trial. Straightforward tort rules take shape in straightforward (if windy) jury
instructions.24 Straightforward jury instructions yield straightforward verdicts.
Straightforward verdicts form the basis of judgments. These judgments in turn join
the ongoing keep-it-simple formation of common law tort doctrine, completing the
circle.
Consistent with almost all of tort law, the economic loss rule hews more
to simplicity than any of the "goals" or meta-theory that torts scholars (who do not
share their field's need to keep it simple) like to emphasize: efficiency, corrective
justice, compensation, insurance, and so on. Tort law refuses to recognize actions
for pure consequential financial loss because these claims are not easy enough to
follow. The ability to sort good claims of economic entitlement from bad requires

21.
Persons convicted of crimes receive augmented prison sentences as
punishment, in effect, for not having pleaded guilty, regardless of whether formal
sentencing guidelines impose this augmentation. Compare Margareth Etienne, Remorse,
Responsibility, and Regulating Advocacy: Making Defendants Pay for the Sins of Their
Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103, 2135 (2003) (describing a "timely guilty plea" as a basis

recognized in the federal guidelines for reducing a defendant's sentence; this reduction is
tantamount to increasing the sentences of those defendants who insist on jury trials), with
Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens' Perceptions of the Criminal
Jury, 12 LAW & Hu.r. BEHAV. 333, 334 (1988) (noting a practice of "imposing harsher
sentences on defendants who request a trial by jury," which predates the rise of sentencing
guidelines).
22.
See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 595, 597 (1993) (describing the ban and proposing a modification).
23.
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat.
2095 (2005) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7903, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924 (2005)).
24.
For example, Florida juries in negligence actions hear a straightforward-ifwindy paragraph:
Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable
care is that degree of care which a reasonably careful person would use
under like circumstances. Negligence may consist either in doing
something that a reasonably careful person would not do under like
circumstances or in failing to do something that a reasonably careful
person would do under like circumstances.
FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES § 4.1 (2004).
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that
a degree of maturity, financial sophistication, and capacity for abstract thought
25
exceeds what tort rules-written for the layperson---can take for granted.
The amateurism that connects liability rules to simplicity is integral to all
of tort law, not just American tort law, where inexpertise and lack of training hold
official power via the jury. Economic loss rules outside the United States, where
juries play virtually no part in negligence litigation,26 still tend to reject claims of
lost financial expectancy due to negligence.27 This rejection suggests that even in
legal systems where adjudication is entirely in the hands of professionals, tort
doctrine must rest on precepts that ordinary people can understand, because tort
law applies with unique force to non-volunteers.28 It is fairer to burden contracting
parties with the strict-liability severity of contract law, and real-property sellers
and buyers with baroque hurdles, fictions, and Statute of Frauds requirements, than
it would be to impose burdensome standards in a field of universal application like
tort. To remain intelligible to prospective plaintiffs, tortfeasor-defendants, and (in
the United States) jurors, tort law must articulate its demands simply, with a
relatively low common denominator in mind.
How simple is simple enough? As a first step toward measurement, we
can look for average abilities to comprehend factual material, conventionally
25.
Disagreement again from Professor Rabin, who believes there is nothing
complicated about "a business that goes under" after its customers can't get there: "As a
parent I could make those scenarios clear to a ten-year-old." Telephone Conversation with
Robert L. Rabin, A. Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, in Stanford,
Cal. (Mar. 29, 2006). Stephen Perry provides a response to this point, referring to
complexities that the ten-year-old might find hard to follow. Stephen R. Perry, Protected
Interests and Undertakings in the Law of Negligence, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 247, 265 (1992)
(noting that a tavern could be put out of business by "negligent interference" but also by
other means that the law condones, and so it becomes hard to say why its owner should
have an action for negligent interference). In mentioning a business destroyed completely
by the loss of custom, Rabin has picked a relatively simple example of economic loss. For
an example that would be harder to explain to his ten-year-old, see infra Part II.B.2
(describing divided decisional law on loss resulting from an evacuation or closure that does
not destroy a business).
See generally Fleming James Jr., Limitations on Liabilityfor Economic Loss
26.
Causedby Negligence: A PragmaticAppraisal,25 VAND. L. REv. 43, 45-46 (1972) (noting
"the remarkable parallel" between outcomes in the British Commonwealth and the United
States, including "details in drawing the line on recovery," as revealed in case law from
both systems that rarely includes citations to foreign decisional law).
27.
Trying to describe the economic loss rule as it functions outside the United
States is a challenge far beyond the scope of this Article. See generally PURE ECONOMIc
Loss INEUROPE (Mauro Bussani & Vernon Valentine Palmer eds., 2003) (noting much
variety in European doctrine alone, to say nothing of other national legal systems). See also
JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST
ENRICHMENT 263 (2006) [hereinafter GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS] ("The rule has been adopted

in some jurisdictions such as Germany, England and the United States and not in others
such as France, Italy, and the Netherlands."). Jurisdictions do not need an economic loss
rule per se to deny recovery; concepts like remoteness can defeat plaintiffs' claims. See id
at 274.
28.
I elaborate in Anita Bernstein, Complaints, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 37, 45
(2000).

20061

KEEP IT SIMPLE

779

expressed in the United States as reading levels that correspond to school grades.29
The average American reads at just below the eighth-grade level. 30 Tort law has
room to raise this low standard a bit. Defendants participate in tort litigation only if
they have enough money to be worth suing, plaintiffs only if they are worldly
enough to maneuver themselves into court (or to be within reach of a recruiter like
a class-action litigator), and jurors only if they bear markers of relative privilege:
driver's licenses, home ownership, registration on the voter rolls. Thus each player
in the tort system is likely to possess more sophistication and formal education
than the average American. As a reading level or approximate mental age for tortliability purposes, late adolescence-which happens to be the onset of adult-level
liability for negligence 3"-seems about right. If this estimate of whether to draw
the line is close enough, then tort rules will emerge comprehensible to the average
American late-teenager, and will not demand more understanding than she can
provide.
This person, though notoriously ignorant about money management and
the causes of financial consequences, 32 would have no trouble with two tort
precepts that can pertain to economic loss. One is that harming another person on
purpose without justification is blameworthy. The other is what only an
exceedingly rare teenager would call assumpsit, the doctrine that holds actors
liable for certain consequences that follow their undertakings or quasi-contracts.
Developmental psychology sites basic awareness of these two concepts in early
childhood, and identifies a more generalized consciousness of them that takes form
in adolescence. 33 A young child might leap into rage after suffering an unprovoked
blow, for instance, or when a caregiver fails to deliver a promised reward. Starting
29.
In talking about cognition and comprehension levels in the American
population I hope not to reopen debates about whether intelligence exists, how to measure
it, or whether it is unitary or varied. Nor do I claim that the ability to comprehend is
distributed in a bell-curve pattern.
30.
Norman M. Goldfarb, How Well Does the Average US. Adult Read?, J.
CLINICAL RES. BEST PRACTICES, Sept. 2005, available at http://www.firstclinical.com (citing
1992 findings and breaking down medians and averages).
31.
Seventeen seems to be about as old as a person can be before forfeiting the
permissive standard of care that children enjoy. Charbonneau v. MacRury, 153 A. 457, 464
(N.H. 1931) (extending to 17-year-old defendant this lower standard of care). Professor
Dobbs adds that a mentally disabled 18-year old whose "mental age" is lower than his
chronological age is held to the standard of his mental age, whereas a mentally disabled
adult would not enjoy this favorable deviation. DOBBS, supra note 18, at 294.
32.
The Jump$tart Coalition for Personal Financial Literacy tests thousands of
high school students each year on personal finance, and consistently reports that 40% to
60% of the students fail the test. See 2006 Survey of Financial Literacy Among High School
Students, http://www.jumpstartcoalition.com/media/2006SurveyWithAnswers.doc. Adults,
whom Jump$tart and most other "financial literacy" advocates do not test, may not
understand money much better than these teenagers. Presumably they learn a bit, however,
from maintaining a bank account, paying interest on credit-card debt, financing the purchase
of an automobile, budgeting for rent or a mortgage, and similar undertakings generally
reserved for adults.
33.
Lawrence Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization: The CognitiveDevelopment Approach, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND
SOCIAL IssuEs 31, 31-53 (Thomas Lickona ed., 1976).
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at about age nine, the child begins to absorb the notion of external disapproval, and
goes on to accept "law and order" as a valuable end.34 In a few years this child will
be nearly ready to sit on a jury passing on claims of battery, say, or the failure to
aid a sick person in a defendant's custody.
Economic loss cases frequently extend beyond these two simple precepts
to incorporate unintentional harms that may or may not include undertakings.
When the harm is accidental and unmediated by agreement, those who make
findings of fact and law need another level of comprehension and cognition to do
their work of adjudicating. Consistent with its rules that children must reach a
certain age before they can be held liable in negligence yet are vulnerable to suits
for intentional torts at any age, tort doctrine demands more maturity and extra
mental effort to decide cases where plaintiffs admit that defendants intended them
no harm, and are not bound to them by explicit promises. Negligence-here, a
failure to act with reasonable care-is not beyond the ken of our late-adolescent
torts player, but the tenet of Keep It Simple limits redress for those injuries that ask
the factfinder to perceive and quantify an abstract loss. Abstract injury is too hard
to perceive even though its dollar value might be easy to calculate.
Here I use "perceive" advisedly: It is almost impossible to speak in
English about understanding without reference to the most cherished of the five
senses. "Observation," "definition," "insight," "illuminate," "enlighten," "vision,"
"reflection," "clarity," "survey," "perspective," "overview," "point of view,"
"intelligent," "idea," "theory," "contemplate," "speculate," and "brilliant," among
other English words that describe cognition, have visual roots.35 Eyesight and the
visual imagination convey reality to human beings. 36 When the wrong in question
is neither intentional nor contractual, for many people it must make visual sense:
The plaintiff must be able to draw a picture, figuratively speaking, that connects its
injury with the defendant's conduct.
Among the interests protected by negligence law, this capacity to be
visualized separates the winners-that is, first, the integrity of a human body and,
second, tangible property-from the big loser, pure economic loss. Occupying the
space between winners and losers on the invaded-interests continuum is emotional
distress-a protected interest that is less weak than economic loss on visuals:
Every human being old enough to be a litigant or a juror has had personal
experience with emotional distress, and has almost certainly seen the
34.
ROLF E. Muuss, THEORIES OF ADOLESCENCE 211 (6th ed. 1996).
35.
See Daniel Chandler, Visual Perception 1, http://www.aber.ac.uk/
medialModules/MC10220/visper01.html. Chandler omits the accident-law favorite
"foreseeability."
36.
The blind not excluded. Consistent with negligence doctrine, whose rules of
reasonable conduct for blind persons may be understood to eschew pity and condescension,
see DOBBS, supra note 18, at 283-84, here I claim only that American law deems inability
to see a deviation from the norm. Visual perception is a fact of life for many blind
individuals. See Nancy H. Kerr & G. William Domhoff, Do the Blind Literally "See " in
Their Dreams? A Critique of a Recent Claim that They Do, 14 DREAMING 230 (2004)

(summarizing current consensus that blind people who were able to see in their early
childhood experience visual dreams); Kate Shatzkin, Research Center to Aid Blind, BALT.

SuN, Jan. 30, 2004, at lB (noting that some legally blind children are visual learners).
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manifestations of distress in others as well. Emotional distress is powerfully
comprehensible to our late-adolescent even without a connection to the visual,37
38
but reaches our factfinder most clearly when it can enter his mind's eye.
In this (pardon the expression) light, most of the rationales for the rule
Preliminary Draft I become not wrong, not even
provided in the Restatement's
"not even wrong,, 39 but rather partial expressions of the simplicity thesis.
Economic loss is only sometimes "incalculable," but it is always invisible, and
thus harder than other types of tort damage for a lay person to grasp. People might
not be "more important" than property, but when the property in question consists
of unrealized economic gains, or obligations to transfer money outside of contract,
these people are at least easier to see. Courts do not uniformly "encourage private
ordering," and contract law is not inherently superior to tort law: Instead, courts
prefer to impose contract and contract-like rules when contracting is feasible,
because this basis for responsibility has deeper roots than negligence in the minds
of our late-adolescent participants, and resonates better with their sense of
injustice.
It is only the second rationale-"economic losses are not social losses"-that cannot be seen (again, pardon me) as partial expression of the simplicity
thesis. To be sure, the economists' explanation of the rule and mine enjoy a fair
degree of overlap. For instance, whereas I would defend the no-liability consensus
in cases where the parties could have allocated the loss in advance by contract on
the ground that contract is a sturdier notion in the late-adolescent mind than
negligence, their stated rationale will be efficiency or welfare or some such, 40 but
we reach the same end. I grant that many economic losses are not social losses and
thus do not offend against welfare. But others are social losses, and economic
analysts of the economic loss rule need to say why they refuse to argue here for the
level of welfare through deterrence that they typically seek. They also need to
explain decisional law. Because the cases sport some inconsistency, nobody can
account for them all, but as I try to show below, the simplicity thesis does better at
describing pure economic loss than its two chief rivals: The law and economics
claim about social losses, which cannot explain as much of the case law as I can,
and the "incalculable" or "floodgates" or "proportionality" rationale, which
explains nothing.
I start this explanation below in Part I, which presents a taxonomy of
economic loss cases. In the hope of doing as much explanatory work as possible, I
See infra Parts I.C, II.B (discussing the role of emotion in strengthening
37.
economic loss claims).
38.
1 use the phrase "our factfinder," along with similar terms like "our
protagonist," to refer to a hypothetical individual who instantiates the Keep ItSimple thesis
by choosing to side with either the plaintiff or the defendant in particular types of economic
loss claims. What this person finds is more commonly understood as a duty of care vel non
rather than facts, but to convey the lay quality of a juror 1 need a more familiar locution than
"our [no-]duty-finder." See also infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (expounding on
the duty question).
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
39.
Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics?, 64 MD.L.
40.
REV. 303, 311-15 (2005) [hereinafter Bernstein, Whatever Happened].
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look at a wider swath of cases than what other writers have chosen in their studies
of the economic loss rule. Part II presents my thesis: Keep It Simple. Part III
undertakes the comparison just mentioned: I investigate how the law and
economics and "floodgates" theses fare, in contrast to Keep It Simple, as
explanations of how cases do (or should) come out. Part IV looks for additional
explanations of the economic loss rule that supplement, rather than compete with,
the Keep It Simple thesis.
Juxtaposing "rivals" against Keep It Simple may require a word of
clarification on how the thesis functions. Although it explains what is frequently
called a limited-duty rule, or a rule about plaintiffs who lose because defendants
owe them no duty, it focuses on lay persons and thus is at odds with traditional
duty, the element of the prima facie case most restricted to professionals. Judges,
advocates, legislators, and perhaps scholars build duty rules as filters. The
perspective on unintentionally inflicted economic loss that I offer here has no
abstract precept to filter claims before plaintiffs can move on to unreasonable
conduct or the causation of harm. 4 1 Instead it is a descriptive, inductive, contextdependent approach to claims as they arise, looking nothing like "duty" in the
sense of ex ante prescriptive tenets. Though consistent with the suggestion of one
scholar that this particular no-duty rule might not be a rule at all but a concern with
remoteness 42 mixed with "common'43sense grounds" that cannot be wedged into
"any rule or principle abstractly,
Keep It Simple nevertheless finds some
predictability and coherence in decisional law. The late-adolescent adjudicator
reaches conclusions about liability that fall at least into patterns, if not rules. 44 She
also reminds us that even duty, the domain of experts, has to reckon with ordinary
people.

I. A TAXONOMY OF CLAIMS FOR UNINTENTIONALLY INFLICTED
ECONOMIC Loss
Scholars diverge on how to sort cases on pure economic loss where
plaintiffs have not accused defendants of inflicting intentional harm. One
taxonomy by Mario Bussani, Vernon Valentine Palmer, and Francesco Parisi
(collectively, "Bussani"), written to reflect the case law of Europe, contains four
groups: "ricochet loss," "transferred loss," "closures of public service and
infrastructures," and "reliance upon flawed information or professional services. 'A
41.
See generally David G. Owen, Duty Rules, 54 VAND. L. REv. 767, 773-74
(1999) (summarizing the categories of cases where plaintiffs cannot recover even though
they can show that the defendant acted unreasonably and that they suffered foreseeable
harm as a result).
42.
GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 27, at 274.
43.
Id. at 279.
44.
And thus may be amenable to testing. An experimental study could ask 17year-olds--or persons of the reading level that takes into account the American average of
about 12 or 13 with a boost added for the elite nature of American tort litigation, see supra
notes 30-31 and accompanying text-what they thought of economic loss scenarios of the
kind described in Part I.
See Mario Bussani, Vernon Valentine Palmer & Francesco Parisi, Liability
45.
for Pure FinancialLoss in Europe: An Economic Restatement, 5t AM. J. COMP. L. 113,
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Another writer finds only three: intellectual services, defective products, and
interference with use of resources. 46 Another presents a five-parter: negligent
misrepresentation, negligent performance of a service, defective products or
structures, public's failure to confer an economic benefit, and relational economic
47
One writer also likes the number five, but divides his list into three
Ioss.
48
Another taxonomy finds eight
categories denying recovery and two allowing it.
4
9
categories. The current draft Restatement responds to this fray by staying out of
it, restricting its taxonomical effort to conclusions about whether the plaintiff can
reach a jury: Its three-parter divides into (1) duty cases; (2) no-duty cases; and (3)
cases where courts may, but need not, find a duty of care. 50 This approach suits a
work like the Restatement that seeks to guide the outcome of future cases. Because
my own aims are descriptive, however, I cannot stay out of the fray; so here I start
with a taxonomy that widens Bussani's (the one rooted in European case law) to
describe the economic-loss landscape.
A. Cases Involving a Contract-Like Relation Between Plaintiffand Defendant
1. "TransferredLoss"

This category of economic loss starts with a tangible injury for which the
victim is not suing. "Here, C causes physical damage to B's property or person, but

a contract between A and B (or the law itself) transfers a loss that would ordinarily
be B's onto A," 5 1 explains Bussani. These transfers "frequently result[] from
leases, sales, insurance agreements and other contracts, separating property rights
from rights of use or risk bearing. 52 Cases like these, which feature express and
usually written contracts, present straightforward illustrations of how a plaintiff
can suffer financial loss from physical damage or personal injury without having
possessed the land, chattel, or human body that suffered impact following the
defendant's negligence.53 Most of subrogation fits in this category.

117-21 (2003) [hereinafter Bussani, Economic Restatement]. The authors have published

several papers with similar titles, sometimes with their names in a different order. One of
them has told me to rely on this one when commenting on their co-authored writing on
economic loss. E-mail from Francesco Parisi to Anita Bernstein, Oct. 7, 2005 (on file with
author).
Herbert Bernstein, Civil Liabilityfor Pure Economic Loss Under American
46.
Tort Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 111, 114-25 (1998).

47.

BRUCE FELDTHUSEN,

ECONOMIC

NEGLIGENCE

12 (4th ed. 2000).

Peter Benson, The Basis for Excluding Liabilityfor Economic Loss in Tort
48.
Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 427, 428-29 (David G. Owen ed.,
1995).
William Bishop & John Sutton, Efficiency andJustice in Tort Damages: The
49.
Shortcomings of the PecuniaryLoss Rule, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 360-61 (1986).
(Preliminary
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ECON. TORTS & RELATED WRONGS i-ii
50.
Draft No. 2, 2006).
Bussani, Economic Restatement,supra note 45, at 118.
51.
Id. at 119.
52.
The leading case is Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303
53.
(1927), which denied a claim for two weeks' worth of lost profits. The plaintiff was the time
charterer of a steamship; the defendant had repaired the steamship negligently, causing the
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Following the general pattern within "pure economic loss," courts
typically decline to find liability here. Tort law is said to reject "negligent
interference with contract," 54 in contrast to the intentional-interference alternative,
which permits recovery when various elements are present. It admits that, for
instance, professional sports teams lose revenue when star athletes are injured by
tortfeasors' negligence, but lets this loss lie where it falls. 55 A long history of case
law rejects separate 56
actions by insurance companies against tortfeasors for harm to
the insured persons.
The transferred-loss category grows murkier, however, if one is willing to
go along with Bussani to consider transfers occasioned by means other than
contract. To illustrate their non-contractual category-what they call "(or the law
itself)"-the authors mention a hypothetical statute that forces private employer A
to continue paying wages to employee B after B is injured through negligence,
even though A receives no work from B during a recovery period.57 The authors
cite neither a pay continuation statute nor a case to illustrate this category, and
continue this omission in their later paper on economic loss that repeats the same
hypothetical.58
Litigation from the 1990s may fill the "transferred loss" illustrations gap.
Local governments that spent money treating gunshot wounds and cigarette-linked
illness brought actions against the handgun and tobacco industries to recoup these
expenses, a type of economic loss connected to the personal injuries to others. It is
perhaps an overstatement to say that "the law itself' "transferred" these losses
from injured persons to governments-not least because case law did not so hold:
most of the gun litigation failed while the government recoupment portion of the
cigarette litigation settled-but at least some fraction of handgunand cigarette59
related injury does force governments to spend public money.
vessel to remain in dry dock for those two weeks. Justice Holmes told the plaintiff charterer
that "[t]he law does not spread its protection so far." Id. at 309.
54.
DOBBS, supranote 18, at 1259, 1283.
55.

The leading case is still Phoenix ProfessionalHockey Club v. Hirmer, 502

P.2d 164 (Ariz. 1972).
56.

This rule, stated first in Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. New York

andNew Haven Railroad,25 Conn. 265 (1856), remains good law. With "separate actions"
I mean to distinguish subrogation, where the insurer stands in the shoes of the insured.
57.

Bussani, Economic Restatement, supra note 45, at 119.

58.
Francesco Parisi, Vernon V. Palmer & Mario Bussani, The Comparative Law
and Economics of Pure Economic Loss (George Mason Law & Economics Working Paper
Series, Paper No. 05-12), available at http://www.ssm.com/abstract-742104. One
commentator on economic loss notes the existence of a pay continuation statute in
Germany. Jurgen G. Backhaus, Pure Economic Loss: An Analysis, in PURE ECONOMIC Loss
IN EUROPE 57, 71 (Mauro Bussani & Vernon Valentine Palmer eds., 2003) (calling the
Engeltfortzahlungsgesetz"a technique to reduce the secondary costs of accidents").
59.
Litigation by hospitals to cover smoking-related expenditures on behalf of
patients has been unsuccessful. Courts have held that these plaintiffs lack standing, perhaps
because their expenditures were more optional, or less necessary, than those of

governments. See Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 436 (3d Cir.
2000) (noting that governments possess "political power" along with a "parens patriae right
to protect the health and welfare" of citizens). Similar claims by union health insurance
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2. Defective Products
Economic loss as well as personal injury can result from defective
products. Unlike most of the categories, this one includes a Supreme Court case,
East River Steam Ship Corp. v. TransamericaDelaval.60 This unanimous decision
upheld equally unanimous lower court rulings, including the Third Circuit en banc;
all the many judges who heard East River Steam Ship agreed that the $8 million in
losses (for repairs and income lost when the ships had to go out of service) that the
plaintiffs, ship charterers, attributed to defects in the ships' engines were not
compensable in tort. This decision strengthened the national prestige of Seely v.
White Motor Co., 6 1 the California Supreme Court decision that had, in 1965,
excluded economic loss from strict products liability claims. So aided by East
River Steam Ship, Seely crushed its rival, Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,Inc.,62 a
New Jersey decision that had come out the opposite way to allow economic loss in
a products liability action a few months earlier.
In the four decades since Seely and the two since East River Steam Ship,
case law has favored the holding they share: Plaintiffs generally cannot recover in
tort (i.e. negligence or strict products liability) for an economic injury that results
from a defect in a product. The paradigm here is financial loss that results in costly
repair of the product, inability to make profitable use of it, or post-accident
64
cleanup, 63 but damage to the product itself also can fit within this generalization.
The remedy for all such losses generally lies in contract. 65 In 1997, the New Jersey

trusts have failed on the ground that insurers have no claim against tortfeasors for harms to
their insureds, absent subrogation. United Food & Commercial Workers Unions v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 223 F.3d 1271, 1273 (11th Cir. 2000); Ass'n of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 241 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2001) ("All other Courts of Appeals that
have addressed the issue have agreed that union trust funds lack standing to bring antitrust
and RICO claims against the tobacco industry to recover their increased expenditures for
treating tobacco-related illnesses.").
60.
476 U.S. 858 (1986). 1 expound on this case in Anita Bernstein, Products
Liability in the United States Supreme Court: A Venture in Memory of Gary Schwartz, 53
S.C. L. REv. 1193, 1200-02 (2002).
61.
403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
62.
207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965).
63.
See, e.g., Kestrel Holdings I, L.L.C. v. Learjet Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 1071,
1076 (D. Kan. 2004) (applying Kansas law to deny plaintiff's economic loss claims, which
included services costs and use of alternative aircraft); Detroit Edison Co. v. NABCO, 35
F.3d 236 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying Michigan law).
64.
See, e.g., Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Major Tool & Mach., Inc., 767 F.2d
446 (8th Cir. 1985) (applying Minnesota law to deny recovery for value of defective
turbine); Delmarva Power & Light v. Meter-Treater, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 564 (D. Del.
2002) (applying Delaware law); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 209 N.W.2d 643
(Neb. 1973) (denying claim for value of failed scaffolding).
65.
Neibarger v. Univ. Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 614-16 (Mich. 1992)
(contrasting the functions of tort with the functions of contract in the economic loss
context); Brown v. Eurocopter S.A., 143 F. Supp. 2d 781, 782 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (endorsing
the distinction as stated in EastRiver Steam Ship).
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Supreme Court issued a decision that all but overruled Santor,66 bringing almost to
a close the controversy over pure economic loss in products liability. Courts
apparently regard this interest as amenable to safeguarding through contract.
3. UnsatisfactoryBuildings
Home buyers and developers have brought many tales of woe to the
courts, featuring builders or a contractor as the villain. Like some other groups of
plaintiffs we have considered, they have encountered judicial disfavor. Individuals
once were precluded even from making claims for personal injury under "the
accepted work doctrine," a vestige of privity, which cut off a builder's liability for
negligence when the buyer accepted the building. 67 Within our subject, economic
loss, plaintiffs sometimes allege that bad construction of a building by a defendant
with which they are not in privity caused them economic loss in the form of
necessary remedial measures or diminished property value. Asbestos abatement, a
special subcategory, involves contaminated structures. In these cases, the plaintiffs
are building owners under a legal duty to remove ("abate") the asbestos, and
defendants are suppliers or manufacturers of this product. This category resembles
"transferred loss" but is a little different: The defendants supplied a satisfactory
product, usually as insulation, that became problematic only later.
4. FlawedServices
Judicial authors and commentators have come up with an array of labels
for this category. Many include the word "information." Reference to information
has the virtue of perhaps capturing more material-stretching from the famous
Cardozo decision finding a weigher of beans liable to a plaintiff who had relied on
the accuracy of the weight reported 68 to judgments against Western Union for
negligent transmittal of business telegraphs 69-- than falls under "flawed services,"
a term I prefer, because it is somewhat more precise and also describes most of the
contemporary cases. Some like to say "professional services," a phrase that invites
confusion about what professional means.7 °
Lawyers often cause this type of economic loss. Courts construe attorney
malpractice mostly in financial terms-disfavoring causes of action for severe
emotional distress and similar sufferings (like wrongful incarceration following
66.

See Boyes v. Greenwich Boat Works, 27 F. Supp. 2d 543, 551 (D.N.J. 1998)

(describing Santor as having been overruled by Alloway v. General Marine Industries, 695

A.2d 264 (N.J. 1997)). Westlaw's KeyCite lists Santor as "abrogated by" Alloway.
67.
DOBBS, supra note 18, at 1043-44.
68.
Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
69.
Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 590-91 n.15 (W. Va. 2000) (citing W.
Union Tel. Co. v. Tatum, 49 So. 2d 673 (Ala, App. 1950) (accepting liability for the delayed
delivery of telegram that had contained a contract offer, thereby causing plaintiff to not
obtain a contract)); Bluefield Milling Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 139 S.E. 638 (W. Va 1927).
70.
The first draft Restatement speaks of a person "who undertakes to render a
service to another as a professional, fiduciary, bailee, or in a similar capacity."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. Loss § 9, at 27 (Preliminary Draft No. 1,
2005). In an illustration, the Restatement treats exterminators as covered, "though pest
extermination is not a profession." Id. § 9 illus. 5, at 33.
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negligent defense in a criminal proceeding) 7'-and so the harms of attorney
malpractice amount to economic loss. Recognized claims in this area include
breaches of duty in the lawyer-client relation and, somewhat more controversially,
deviations from a professional standard of care that cause losses to certain types of
nonclients. For example, an attorney might prepare a testamentary instrument
negligently for a client and through this negligence cause another individual not to
inherit money.72 Parties to real estate transactions have prevailed in some
negligence actions against lawyers who worked not for them but for the other party
to the sale, or a bank with an interest in their transaction.73
Accountants, auditors, and other professional reviewers of financial
conditions who do not fulfill relevant standards of care in examination have been
held liable to investors who relied on the accuracy of their reports as a condition of
investment. Like attorney malpractice, this subject has been roiled by controversy
on the question of liability to nonclients. Courts universally say yes, but vary in
how generously they bend privity of contract in favor of plaintiffs.
A miscellany of other providers inflict economic loss when they render
their services negligently. Maladroit architects can topple a building. 74 Drugtesting laboratories can mistakenly determine that an employee or job applicant
uses unlawful drugs and thus cause this current or prospective worker to forfeit
76
75
remunerative work. Negligence by a notary public can result in economic loss.
Insurers working on real estate purchases sometimes miss defects in title.77
Carelessness by adoption agencies can impose on adoptive parents a financial
burden that they might not have experienced if the agencies had taken care to
disclose the physical or mental health conditions that the children had.78

71.

Joseph J. Kelleher, Note, An Attorney's Liabilityfor the Negligent Infliction

of Emotional Distress, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1309 (1990) (noting that courts seldom
recognize this claim); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., SUSAN P. KONIAK, ROGER C. CRAMTON &
GEORGE M. COHEN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 898 (4th ed. 2005) ("As a

practical matter, criminal defense lawyers are not accountable to their clients in malpractice
actions.").
72.
The leading disappointed-heirs case is Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal.
1958). For a more recent return to the subject, allowing the claim, see Harrig/eld v.
Hancock, 90 P.3d 884 (Idaho 2004), answering a certified question from the Ninth Circuit.
73.
See Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987); McCamish v. F.E.
Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1999); Collins v. Binkley, 750 S.W.2d 737 (Tenn.
1988).
74.

See generally Note, ArchitecturalMalpractice: A Contract-BasedApproach,

92 Harv. L. Rev. 1075 (1979) (describing this cause of action).
75.
See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 112 (contrasting Duncan v. Afton, Inc., 991
P.2d 739 (Wyo. 1999) (finding the claim valid), with Ney v. Axelrod, 723 A.2d 719 (Pa.
1999) (rejecting the claim)).
76.
Biakanja v. Irving, mentioned above in note 72, involved a notary public
rather than an attorney as defendant.
77.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. Loss § 9 illus. 6, at 33-34
(Preliminary Draft No. 1, 2005).
78.
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 113-14.
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5. Spoliation

79

"Spoliation," or "the destruction, alternation, or mutilation of evidence,"
is more than just a tort. Evidence law, for instance, uses the term to refer to an
inference against one party in a civil case. ° In torts, spoliation refers to an action
for damages by an individual who suffers harm to her claim in litigation following
the defendant's destruction of evidence. 8 ' A products liability claim, for example,
might succeed only if what remains of an injurious product is available for
inspection at trial.

The choice to discuss spoliation here-that is, considering it among
"contract-like paradigms" rather than focusing on its accidental destruction of
property2 -reflects the state of the cases. Most jurisdictions do not recognize the
tort of spoliation, and among the decisions that do recognize it, most involve an
undertaking or bailment by the defendant. Discussing spoliation in a book chapter
about economic loss in the United States, Gary Schwartz singles out only one case
for praise: Coprich v. Superior Court,83 for its "valuable point about contractual
possibilities": Anyone who wants someone else to preserve valuable evidence
"should secure from the third party an agreement that it will do so; such a
contractual agreement is then appropriate for judicial enforcement." 84 It seems
reasonable, then, for this taxonomy to proceed on the premise that an undertaking
is integral, if not absolutely necessary, to a claim of negligent spoliation.
B. Impediments to the Plaintiff's Regular Business Operations
The categories of the previous section involved undertakings or
agreements between the defendant and someone else, not always the plaintiff. Here
we move to accidental harms where contracts play a diminished role. The
wrongful behavior in the cases discussed in this section consists of the infliction of
tangible, visible damage in a way that affects another's economic expectancy.
1. PhysicalHarms to Property that the PlaintiffDoes Not Own
a. Damage to Utility Lines
In this class of cases, the defendant negligently causes damage to a source
of some resource like water, heating, electric power, air conditioning and the like
that is necessary for the plaintiffs business operations. Its negligence takes

79.

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S

DICTIONARY

OF

LAW

(2001),

available at

http://research.lawyers.com/glossary/spoliation.html.
80.
For a recent discussion of spoliation in the law of evidence, see Durst v.
FedEx Express, No. 03-5186, 2006 WL 1541027 (D.N.J. Jun. 2, 2006).

81.
Spoliation can be intentional or negligent. Most of the cases involve
unintentional destruction and so, consistent with this Article's focus on accidents as well as
the majority of problems that reach the courts, we will assume negligence rather than
intentional destruction. Cf Schwartz, supra note 2, at 112 (calling the tort "negligent

spoliation").
82.

See infra Part B. 1.

83.

95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 884 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).

84.

Schwartz, supra note 2, at 113.
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physical expression in property not owned by the plaintiff, who suffers (only)
economic loss in consequence of this physical harm. A leading case in the norecovery canon, Byrd v. English, falls in this category.85 As a general
87 rule, courts
86
view this kind of claim with hostility, although exceptions appear.
b. Damage to Public Environments or Infrastructures
88

This category relates closely to the next one, evacuations and closures,
but with more focus on the property-like interests of plaintiffs. Here defendants
harm or destroy public spaces, of which the Restatement (Second) gives several
examples: highways, bridges, streets, streams. 89 Economic activity revolving
around water-coves, harbors, rivers, even seawater around a dock--dominates
this case law. Whereas most accidentally inflicted economic loss gets captioned as
negligence, some litigants bring actions in public nuisance: Public nuisance law
will recognize a claim where the plaintiff suffered an injury different in kind from
what the general public suffered. 90 Under this analysis, used in negligence as well
as nuisance, notably successful plaintiffs have been people who catch fish and
seafood for a living. 91 Courts appear to have identified a property interest in what
they pull out of the water and sell.
2. Evacuationsand Closures

In this group of cases, the plaintiff loses money when carelessness by the
defendant forces authorities to close or evacuate a discrete area that the plaintiff
does not own. This closure, by impeding the plaintiffs business, causes economic
loss. Although the consequences to the plaintiff resemble those of the previous
category, "accidents that produce tangible physical effects," the category is
different: Here it is less clear that anyone can prevail against the negligent actor-lack of a tangible injury occludes all potential claims. One would expect

85.
43 S.E. 419 (Ga. 1903). Byrd, cited by Justice Holmes in Robins, is a classic
expression of floodgates reasoning: If this plaintiff can sue, who can't?
86.
See Cargill, Inc., v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 615 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1980);
FMR Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., 613 N.E.2d 902 (Mass. 1993); Chambers v. Spruce
Lighting Co., 95 S.E. 192 (W. Va. 1918).
87.
In Green Mountain Power Corp. v. GeneralElectric Corp., 496 F. Supp. 169
(D. Vt. 1980), the court allowed the claim, flatly rejecting the rule of no recovery for
negligent interference with contract.
88.

See infraPart II.B.2.

89.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (1979).
90.
Pegeen Mulhern, Comment, Marine Pollution, Fishers,and the Pillarsof the
Land A Tort Recovery Standardfor Pure Economic Losses, 18 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv.
85, 101 (1990).
91.
Louisiana v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the
only plaintiffs stating a claim against the negligently piloted merchant vessel were those
who lost their opportunity to obtain fish and seafood from the area); Union Oil Co. v.
Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974); Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D.
Va. 1981); Burgess v. MV Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. h, illus. 11 (1979).
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economic-loss plaintiffs to fare even worse in the evacuation cases than they do in
tangible-damage-to-someone-else cases.92 They do fare poorly.93
Two famous cases defy the pattern. The most notorious piece of
decisional law in this category is People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated
Rail Corp.,94 where the New Jersey Supreme Court forthrightly characterized the
plaintiffs claim as "unaccompanied by property damage or personal injury." 95
Negligence by the defendant, Conrail, caused a chemical fire in a railroad yard.
Worried that the fire might lead to an explosion, authorities evacuated the
plaintiffs nearby airport terminal, causing the plaintiff to forfeit bookings and
96
thereby lose revenue. The court allowed the claim. In J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory,
decided a few years earlier, the California Supreme Court upheld the claim of a
restaurant business against a contractor for negligent delays in its remodeling of a
local airport. Following these delays the plaintiff, whose only connection to the
defendant contractor was its lease for space in the airport terminal that the
contractor was remodeling, sued for profits that it lost during the unreasonably
elongated construction period and the time during which it could not open because
of the lack of air conditioning. The court agreed with the restaurant plaintiff that

92.
The New York Court of Appeals expounded on this subject in 532 Madison
Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. FinlandiaCenter, Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097 (N.Y. 2001). When
part of a building fell down in midtown Manhattan, plaintiff business lost money due to
closure and access difficulties for their customers. Holding that they could not recover, the
court reviewed two intermediate-appellate precedent cases, both arising out of the same
accident, an explosion that caused both property damage to a nearby business and a loss of
electric power that affected several nearby plants. In an action by the nearby business that
had suffered property damage, the Appellate Division recognized a claim for economic loss
as well as for the property damage. In the related case, brought by workers at a nearby
factory who lost wages when the plant closed temporarily, the Appellate Division held that
the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action. Id. at 1102-03.
93.
See In re Marine Navigation Sulphur Carriers v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 638
F.2d 700, 702 (4th Cir. 1981) (rejecting claim of shippers foreclosed from navigable waters
in Virginia); In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (dismissing
claims of business entities that lost business when a channel was ordered closed); In re
Williamson Leasing Co., 577 F. Supp. 890 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (finding no liability for
economic loss following the closing of a railroad bridge for 91 days); Gen. Pub. Utils. v.
Glass Kitchens of Lancaster, Inc., 542 A.2d 567 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (rejecting claim based
on Amish loss of tourist revenue after Three Mile Island). Multi-plaintiff litigation in Philip
Morris, Inc. v. Emerson, 368 S.E.2d 268 (Va. 1988), arising out of a chemical-leakage
accident, illustrates the tendency of courts to regard this harm as intangible and,
accordingly, less than real. Pertinent among these claims was that of a nearby campground
that had to evacuate. Finding "no evidence that any of the pentaborane gas actually invaded
the campground," the Virginia Supreme Court denied this claim. Id.at 282. For an example
of the same outcome in an English court, see Weller & Co. v. Foot & Mouth Disease
Research Institute, (1966) 1 Q.B. 569, rejecting a claim by auctioneers for lost commissions
following the closure of a market due to the fear of cattle disease that defendants'
negligence had engendered.
94.
495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985).
95.
Id. at 108.
96.
598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979).
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the dilatory contractor had breached a duty to it, and held that these lost profits
were foreseeable.97
The bulk of economic-loss case law repudiates People Express and
J'Aire. Some of this repudiation takes place under the label of proximate cause.
Petitions of Kinsman Transit Co. (Kinsman 1), 98 for instance, appears in torts
casebooks as a proximate-cause two-part note case rather than an economic loss
case, even though Kinsman II includes plaintiffs who could not use the Buffalo
River for navigation because of an obstruction attributable to negligence and
thereby lost income. This economic loss, said the Second Circuit, was "too
remote." 99 As a subset of economic-loss case law, much of which can be said to
illustrate remoteness,' 0 0 the closure category seems particularly vulnerable to this
condemnation.'01
C. Emotions Mixed with FinancialLoss
In this category, plaintiffs add references to their dignity or emotional
state to their claims for lost money. Such causes of action hardly warrant the label
of "pure" economic loss; one might call these efforts a search for redress of the
monetizable and the non-monetizable combined.
1. Defamation

Because a defamation plaintiff need not prove physical impact, damage to
tangible property, emotional effects, or intentional conduct by the defendant, this
cause of action warrants a place in a taxonomy of unintentional economic loss.
Defamation actions seek to repair harm to "reputation," an interest that includes
the plaintiff's economic well-being along with the value of her good name.

97.
Id.at 61-64. Along with the major exceptional holdings of People Express
and J'Aire, case law on evacuations and closures includes a couple of successful claims by

excavator plaintiffs that suffered economic loss when a utility defendant negligently failed
to mark the location of its power lines, causing the plaintiffs to suffer lost profits from
unwanted "down time." A&L Underground, Inc. v. City of Port Richey, 732 So. 2d 480,
481 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Followell v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 663 N.E.2d 1122,
1124 (I11.
App. 1996). These claims relied, however, on state-specific rights of action
declared explicitly in statutes. See Coastal Conduit & Ditching, Inc., v. Noram Energy
Corp., 29 S.W.3d 282, 288-90 (Tex. App. 2000) (distinguishing A&L Undergroundand
Followell in a decision that "decline[d] to follow J'Aire Corp. and People Express

Airlines," preferring to join "the majority of jurisdictions which have considered this
issue"). A statute also controlled in Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757
(Alaska 1999), where the Alaska Supreme Court held that under a state statute Exxon had to
pay municipalities for the indirect costs of the notorious Exxon Valdez accident.
98.
388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) (Kinsman 11);
see also In re Kinsman Transit
Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964) (Kinsman I).
99.
Kinsman 11, 388 F.2d at 824.
100.
See infra Part III.B.
101.
See David Gruning, Pure Economic Loss in American Tort Law: An
Unstable Consensus, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 187, 194-95 (2006) (discussing "remoteness" as
central to Kinsman and also to the economic-loss problem of negligent failure to confine a
diseased animal whose escape closes an auction).
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Although these claims can include emotional and dignitary injury, 10 2 economic
loss often dominates. One section of the Restatement (Second) gives four
examples of "special harm" accompanying defamatory statements that the law will
redress-telling the plaintiffs employer that the plaintiff is a labor agitator and
thereby causing the plaintiff to lose his job; telling the plaintiffs employer that the
plaintiff is "unchaste," with the same result; saying that a person engaged to be
married has a venereal disease, causing his fiancee to break the engagement; and
announcing that a merchant uses false weights and measures, causing a loss of
of these examples focus on economic loss more than any other
business. Three
03
type of harm.'
10 4

2. Wrongful death

In a wrongful death action, a relative of a person who died as the result of
tortious (usually negligent) conduct depicts this dead person as a source of value to
him or her as the decedent's close relative. This statutory cause of action, unknown
to the common law that clung to its actio personalis maxim, 10 5 accompanies a
related statutory cause of action, the "survival statute," but protects different
interests. 106 A survival statute allows the representative of a dead plaintiff to
proceed with litigation on behalf of this deceased person, as if she had not died.
Wrongful death, by contrast, sites the loss in heirs rather than the decedent herself.
Courts measure the value of this lost life in two ways. First, they can count the
amount of support that the decedent's dependents would have expected to receive
but for the wrongful death. 107 Second, they can estimate the amount of savings the
decedent would have accumulated but for the wrongful 8 death, and presume that
she would have left her estate to these family members.10

102.
103.

Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,460-61 (1976).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 622 (1977).

By classifying wrongful death as an economic loss claim, this heading opens
104.
the related question of whether to add consortium to this category. See Bussani, Economic
Restatement, supra note 45, at 124 (putting together "pure economic loss, emotional distress

and consortium" as examples of "limitations imposed on the extent of compensable harm").
Certainly consortium contains a pecuniary element, at least in its history; the cause of action
began with a master's claim for loss of services resulting from the enticement or injury of
his servant. DOBBS, supra note 18, at 842. Today, however, Professor Dobbs's phrase
"[loss of consortium as a species of emotional harm," id. at 841, appears more accurate
than an economic-loss characterization.
Actio personalis moriturcum persona, or, "[a] personal action (arising out of
105.
a tort) dies with the person." Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionaryof Law: A Fragment
(Part1 of 3), 94 YALE L.J. 1855, 1912 (1985).

supranote 18, at 803.

106.

DOBBS,

107.

Id. at 808.

108.

Id. at 810-11. Professor Dobbs notes that this measure is perhaps more

speculative than the loss-of-support alternative because the decedent "might have left her

estate to different beneficiaries, or might [have] consumed it all in the costs of nursing
homes or otherwise." Id. at 811.
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D. Harm to Intellectual Property
Including wrongful death in this taxonomy moves from the common law
to statutes. Dan Dobbs heads further down this path: As part of his discussion of
economic loss in his treatise on torts, Professor Dobbs mentions copyright and
trademark as examples of how the law recognizes "stand-alone economic
interests" by statute.10 9 Some would exclude copyright and trademark infringement
from a canon of tort subjects, 110 and I do not understand Dobbs to be insisting on
their inclusion. Instead he brings up copyright and trademark to point out that
recognition of "pure" economic interests without personal injury or property
damage is not alien to the law. Like the other causes of action included in this
taxonomy, copyright and trademark infringement can be committed
unintentionally,'
do not of themselves cause personal injury or damage to
tangible property, and inflict economic loss.

II. THE SIMPLICITY THESIS
To review: Keep It Simple begins with the observation that tort law
governs relations among persons who have not volunteered for attention from the
law. Accordingly it must, on the one hand, be intelligible to nonexperts and
unworldly persons. On the other hand, because tort law as practiced requires a
modicum of money or sophistication to play the game, these players are better
educated and more comfortable with abstraction than the average person, who in
the United States reads slightly below the eighth grade level. From here it becomes
approximately correct to say that tort rules are aimed at a reading, or more
generally a cognitive, level of about age 17.112
The experiences and limitations of a person at this developmental stage
are constitutive of tort doctrine. Some financial losses are easy for this person to
understand. Any teenager has for many years been familiar with intentional
wrongdoing, as both agent and object, and so would with no difficulty recognize
torts like deceit and conversion. Economic loss discussed in this Article derives
from unintentional conduct, however, and unintentional harm is not actionable
109.
DOBBS, supra note 18, § 482A (Supp. 2005).
110.
Decisional law has applied the tort rubric to intellectual property violations.
See, e.g., Polar Bear Prods., Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 720 (9th Cir. 2004)
(citations omitted) (holding that because trademark infringement "sounds in tort," its statute
of limitations under Montana law is that of a tort claim); Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie
& Co., 329 F.3d 923, 931 (7th Cir. 2003); Ted Browne Music Co. v. Fowler, 290 F. 751,
754 (2d Cir. 1923) ("[I]nfringement of a copyright is tort .... ").
Ill.
As George Harrison learned to his dismay when the Second Circuit found
that his song "My Sweet Lord" infringed a copyright, even though the trial judge also found
that he did not do so consciously. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Inc., 722 F.2d
988, 997 (2d Cir. 1983). For an older statement of the point, see Johns &Johns PrintingCo.
v. Paull-PioneerMusic Corp., 102 F.2d 282, 283 (8th Cir. 1939), which notes that intent to
infringe is not an element of copyright violation. On trademark, see Sunward Electronics,
Inc. v. McDonald, 362 F.3d 17, 25 (2d Cir. 2004), which notes that intent to deceive is not
an element of trademark infringement; nor is good faith a defense.
112.
See Goldfarb, supra note 30 (expressing hope that this approximation will be
refined following future study).
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without the breach of some duty. Our 17-year-old understands assumpsit, the idea
that undertakings create responsibilities. When there is no undertaking and the loss
is (only) economic the existence, and in turn the breach, of duty grows more
abstract for this factfinder, more difficult to comprehend. Two additions help
convey the reality of injury when present in economic loss claims: a reference to
the emotional context of a natal family, and a visual image of the injury.
A. Assumpsit or Not
Individuals regard contracts as constituents of justice. Developmental
psychology can help us consider which claims are simple enough yet also
compelling enough to resonate with participants in the American systems of tort
adjudication. To describe its contributions, I rely on the work of the theorist
deemed central to this subject: Lawrence Kohlberg."
With respect to the sense of morality and justice, Kohlberg situates the
late adolescent at Stage 3 or 4 of a six-stage hierarchy (or perhaps only a five-stage
hierarchy, the sixth being hard to attain in lived human experience). The first stage
in moral development is an "obedience and punishment orientation." The young
child identifies wrong behavior as that which receives punishment. At Stage 2, a
child sees persons as individuals possessing self-interest. These two early stages
are "preconventional morality," wherein children see morality as external to what
they do. In the next two stages, "conventional morality," adolescents identify
themselves as members of society. Stage 3 introduces the pursuit of "good
interpersonal relationships." Kohlberg's Stage 4, summed up as "law and order"
and "maintaining
the social order," focuses on what is good for society as a
1 14
whole.'
For present purposes, we need not dwell on the criticism of Kohlberg that
Stage 4 may not really represent an advance from Stage 3.115 Instead, we can focus
on the rung Stages 3 and 4 occupy together, Kohlberg's conventional morality.
Tort liability rules must resonate for persons at this stage. After they move further
along, reaching "postconventional morality," individuals reflect on the nature of a
good society (in Stage 5) and later, at the elusive Stage 6, might pursue universal
principles. Stages 5 and 6 are not simple enough for Keep It Simple.
Undertakings make sense to our factfinder: Conventional morality at
stages 3 and 4 recognizes many claims that can be classified under contract or
assumpsit. Protests following breached contracts will win support. While inclined
to honor contract-like understandings, the factfinder is not a lawyer, and has no
affinity for legalisms. A person at stage 3 or 4 might cut plaintiffs slack on formal
requirements of contract law like consideration and the statute of frauds. But this

113.
In law reviews, Kohlberg is a controversial thinker. See infra note 115 and
accompanying text. Here I put aside controversy-Kohlberg and stay within consensusKohlberg.
114.
RONALD F. DUsKA & MARIELLEN WHELAN, MORAL DEVELOPMENT: A GUIDE
TO PIAGET AND KOHLBERG 45-47 (1975).
115.
See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 18 (1982).

20061

KEEP IT SIMPLE

795

liberality has important limits: Our late-teenager will not honor every claim of loss
following every type of undertaking.
Conventional morality denies that individuals can help themselves to the
property of others simply by assertion. Stage 3 demands that people defer to roles
and responsibilities within groups, and Stage 4 expects people to fulfill their duties
with respect to society and group welfare. To satisfy the demands of conventional
morality, plaintiffs expecting defendants to compensate them for money they lost,
or did not get, from an undertaking must present their claims in terms of duties. If
they failed to make the bargain that would have obviated their loss, our factfinder
would generally hold them responsible for their own lapse. A deal is a deal, says
conventional morality, and the absence of a deal is in turn the absence of a deal." 6
Transferred loss provides an example of contract-assumpsit reasoning for
our factfinder. "Here," Bussani begins, "C causes physical damage to B's property
or person, but a contract between A and B (or the law itself) transfers a loss that
would ordinarily be B's onto A. ' 17 Putting aside the parenthetical "(or the law
itself)" for a minute, our factfinder will see this category in terms of an unexcused
failure to make the right contract. If a contract between A and B transferred the loss
that C caused to B's property onto A, then Keep It Simple will let the loss fall onto
A, on the ground that A is responsible for the contracts it makes or could have
made but failed to make. Though unversed in terms of art, this factfinder would
reach a conclusion consistent with the law of subrogation and negligent
interference with contractual relations.
Losses transferred by "the law itself' are another matter for this
participant in the tort system. Such losses will not look simple, and our factfinder
will not feel competent to resolve them. She is new, after all, to the idea of positive
law as a distinct imperative. Whereas this person would without much struggle
reject claims by private parties for losses that were transferred onto them, and
would rule in favor of different plaintiffs in economic loss cases with equal
swiftness, she would have no insight into what to do with the subrogation-like
claims for recoupment that local governments have brought against manufacturers
of cigarettes and handguns. Not surprisingly, American law has kept juries at a
distance from these claims." 8 Pay continuation statutes, the other example of
losses transferred by "the law itself," are virtually nonexistent in the United States,
116.
In this sense Keep It Simple recalls a contribution to the economic loss
literature from law and economics: the concept of "channeling contracts," whose formation
the law might choose to encourage by denying liability. Mario J. Rizzo, A Theory of
Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281, 282 (1982). The denial of
recovery in tort teaches prospective plaintiffs who lack privity of contract with the
prospective tortfeasor to seek indemnification in advance from another person or entity. For
a detailed critique of channeling as both a positive and a normative theory, see Ronan Perry,
Relational Economic Loss: An Integrated Economic Justification for the Economic Loss
Rule, 56 RUTGERS L. REv. 711, 776-81 (2004).

117.
118.

See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
See Andrew S. Cabana, Missing the Target: Municipal Litigation Against
Handgun Manufacturers: Abuse of the Civil Tort System, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1127,
1135-45, 1160-65 (2001) (summarizing the application of standing and other doctrines to
reject municipalities' claims for handgun-related economic loss).
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and so this subcategory disappears within American law. Asbestos abatement
becomes another exception unamenable to adjudication by this factfinder: Losses
derived from a duty to abate asbestos resemble pay continuation and subrogation,
transferred mainly by "the law itself," rather than the harms plaintiffs experience
and recount, and so it too retreats from the jury-focus of American law.
Our factfinder looks askance at the remainder of paradigmatic cases
classified above as contract-like. Claimants reporting economic loss resulting from
defective products, disappointed possessors of (most) buildings," 19 and victims of
spoliation generally could have looked out for themselves with a contract and thus
do not appear entitled to a post hoc rescue in court by our protagonist. Non-privy
recipients of bad services like flawed accountings would also lose, unless they can
identify themselves as, in effect, third-party beneficiaries.
This person does understand duties of beneficence based on power and
subordination: Stages 3 and 4 give a person ample experience with hierarchies that
create duties. Parents and children, teachers and pupils, employers and employees
all convey paternalism as a source of obligation, and so a person at the
conventional-morality stage would reject reform proposals like the suggestion to
replace medical malpractice liability with contract. 20 When the contexts
supporting a paternalistic relation between defendant and plaintiff are not present,
however, our factfinder has no problem letting adverse outcomes lie where they
fall.
Thus far Keep It Simple has aligned itself generally in the camp of
defendants, finding that the absence of a contract precludes liability. The next two
sections show a pro-plaintiff side of our factfinder. This person brings an
emotional and familial history to accept several economic loss claims that add
injured feelings or violations of the hearth to the loss of money. Visual images can
also persuade this factfinder that an economic loss is tangible and thus warrants
redress.
B. Empathy
Certain claims that mix emotion with financial loss resonate at stages 3
and 4. Defamation doctrine accords with Keep It Simple by relating the reputation
of human beings to an interest they hold along with their personality. It ranks
economic-expectancy-related-to-reputation above economic expectation of the
contract-like category just described--defamation plaintiffs fare better than, say,
spoliation plaintiffs-in a way that a teenager, who knows what it means to be
denigrated or humiliated before other people, would readily understand.
Defamation doctrine accordingly takes personal defamation more seriously than
insults that harm the reputation of a business, which are covered under the less
119.
See infra notes 170-173 and accompanying text (distinguishing homes from
commercial buildings).
This idea was first announced in Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice:
120.
The Casefor Contract, 1AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 87 (1976), and explored extensively in later
decades. See Gary T. Schwartz, Medical Malpractice, Tort, Contract,and Managed Care,
1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 885, 897 (providing a twenty-year history of this proposal in the
academy).
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plaintiff-friendly rubrics of injurious falsehood, trade libel, commercial
disparagement, slander of title, or "veggie libel.'' It does not care about the
reputations of dead people,' 22 a stance that most adolescent adjudicators would
endorse. Wrongful death claims-stories told by survivors about the relatives they
miss-come across as accounts of genuine loss, however.
Harms to buildings have two aspects that pertain to the Keep It Simple
thesis. On one hand they fall under the contract-like classification, making our
factfinder unsympathetic to plaintiffs. On the other hand, certain types of buildings
engage emotions, opening an opportunity for sympathy for the plaintiff.'23 The
next section extends this theme to the visual dimension.
C. Visuals

Although the dominance of sight over the other four senses that we have
noted is a generalization applicable to persons of all ages, visual perception is, like
Kohlberg's "moral stages," a developmental phenomenon. The developmental
psychologist Anne Schlottmann has identified "[i]nnate perceptual causality" 124
as
the technique by which young children begin to understand cause and effect.
Whereas Piaget, titan of the field, had claimed that children learn causality by
"feeling the efficacy of [their] own actions," Schlottmann interpreted later
experimental work to find that observation is more fundamental to causal
understanding than experience. 25 Adults go on to understand causality in terms of
mechanisms: Invisible electricity, they learn, can make a toy car move. We adults
have taught ourselves not to overrely on what we see, 26 although the lesson is
shaky: "At one time or another," according to a neuroscience text, "almost all of us
have been charmed by the skill of an effective ventriloquist. You don't quite
suspend your belief that wooden heads can't talk, .

.

. but because the dummy's

lips, eyes, and head are moving and the ventriloquist's aren't, you experience the
voice as coming from the dummy."' 127 The "ventriloquist effect" refers to

121.
DOBBS, supra note 18, at 1138-39. Dobbs refers to "sirloin slander" as well
as "veggie libel" statutes. Id. at 1139 ("These statutes, using varied language, permit claims
based upon false statements about food products.").
122.
Id. ("No action lies for defamation of the dead.").
123.
Rhode Island case law illustrates the point. See Boston Inv. Prop. #1 State v.
E.W. Burman, Inc., 658 A.2d 515 (R.I. 1995) (answering certified question: no liability for
economic loss when a parking lot didn't hold up). Rhode Island later limited this holding to
commercial transactions, first expressly in Rousseau v. K.N. Construction, Inc., 727 A.2d
190 (R.I. 1999), and then implicitly in Nichols v. R.R. Beaufort & Associates, Inc., 727 A.2d
194 (R.I. 1999).
124.
Anne Schlottmann, Perception Versus Knowledge of Cause and Effect in
Children: When Seeing is Believing, CuRRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI., Aug. 2001, at

I11, 112, availableat http://www.psychol.ucl.ac.uk/babylab/Schlottmann%202001 .pdf.
125.
Id.
126.
Id. at 113.
127.
BARRY E. STERN & M. ALEX MEREDITH, THE MERGING OF THE SENSES
(1993).
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intersensory bias-where "the visual modality predominates, ,,128 in adlssw
adults as well
as children.
This simple hierarchy-visual observation for beginners, mechanistic
neo-Humean hypotheses for the advanced-may be of interest beyond
developmental psychology. It is, of course, not so simple. Schottmann warns that
"mechanism-based causality" may not be "automatically subsuming its
precursor."' 29 Human beings learn mechanistic causality "usually [as] a matter of
hypothesis, not fact, and perceptually designated causes are not necessarily
wrong." 130 This warning heeded, consider a few starting points: First, vision- or
perception-based accounts of reality, including causality, come across to human
beings as convincing before mechanistic accounts do. Second, the ventriloquist
effect has no counterpart assigning privilege to another of the five senses: When
sensory inputs conflict, human beings rate visually obtained information as more
reliable than information conveyed by other senses. Third, as I have developed at
length elsewhere, American legal doctrine manifests its own occasional
ventriloquist effect, or privileging of the visual.13' If these premises are credited, it
becomes possible to explore the role of visually obtained information in the
landscape of no-duty rules for economic loss.
The point regarding visuals applies to economic loss cases to which the
contracts-assumpsit paradigm does not speak. It accords with the rule of no
liability for accidents that impede normal business operations. Plaintiffs cannot
recover for damage to utility lines because this damage cannot be understood as a
picture: Our factfinder can visualize a downed telephone pole but not its
connection to the economic loss of a business. Similarly, the economic loss
attributable to closures and evacuations-again, with no significant visual
images-will have to lie where it falls.
On the plaintiffs side of the ledger, the visual bias of Keep It Simple
affirms the prevailing view that those who earn profits by capturing fish and
seafood from public waters have a claim for economic loss when a defendant
negligently prevents them from carrying out their work. Images of fishermen or
oysterwomen kept ashore at the edge of polluted or barricaded waters with empty
lines or nets in hand-or reeling in poisoned corpses rather than fresh foodresonate in the mind's eye. This image is much more acute than one of
disappointed recreationists turned away from public waters when they want to
catch fish for sport, or swim, or snorkel.

128.
Id.
129.
Schlottmann, supra note 124, at 113.
130.
Id.I have noted the tendency of American doctrine on the one hand to regard
the visual as primitive, superstitious, or otherwise erroneous and bound to be superseded in
the future through enlightenment, and on the other to privilege visible and tangible interests
over interests that can be manifest only in words or abstractions. Bernstein,
RepresentationalDialectic,supranote 1.
131.
Among my examples in RepresentationalDialectic were obscenity and civil
asset forfeiture. These doctrines impose criminal and quasi-criminal sanctions on
individuals by focusing not on harm, the traditional concern of the criminal law, but on the
presence of a visible object. See id.
at 322-40.
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The visual priority in Keep It Simple is consistent with other rules noted
in the Part I taxonomy. Copyrights and trademarks are amenable to visual
perception: Our young factfinder can see anything that can be copyrighted-even
computer code---or that serves as a distinctive business mark, and has no trouble
understanding the appropriation or misuse of it. The rule that the dead and the
merely incorporated cannot be defamed 132 makes sense at Stages 3 and 4, where
abstractions and invisible entities elude attention.

III. "KEEP IT SIMPLE" MEETS ITS CHIEF RIVALS
In this Part, I compare the Keep It Simple thesis with its chief rival
sources of explanation for the no-recovery rule: First, law and economics; second,
"the floodgates," an overriding concern with unbounded liability to an
undifferentiated class of claimants. The comparison looks to decisional law, asking
whether cases come out consistent with any of these three explanations.
Inconsistency within this case law means that no descriptive theory can explain
every case; but of the three, Keep It Simple aligns best with what courts have
decided.
A. Keep It Simple vs. Law and Economics
1. The Explanation
Economic analysts focus on social losses or "socially relevant
externalities,"'' 33 as distinguished from the "private" losses that individuals suffer.
The social losses of a particular action consist of the sum of all private losses
minus the sum of all benefits that this conduct generates. 134 In this metric, financial
losses certainly count: "[T]he purely economic nature of the harm suffered by the
victim should not be dispositive and liability should be imposed on the tortfeasor,"
Mauro Bussani with his co-authors writes, "whenever the accident is the source of
a socially relevant loss.' 13 5 To the extent that the conduct in question causes only
private loss that is not socially relevant-paradigmatically, because it is offset by
social gains-tort law should not hold a defendant liable.
Bussani discusses some of the categories considered here and identifies
what he deems the optimal legal response. For transferred loss, he claims
"normative agnosticism;" 3 6 either liability or no liability is fine, so long as the
rules (a) preclude double recovery by plaintiffs and (b) permit some party--either
the person who suffers economic loss or the stakeholder in the person or property
harmed-to recover. For utility cases, Bussani favors liability: "[T]he asset's
market price does not capture the full surplus that third parties derive" from its use,
and so limiting recovery to whatever loss the utility company suffers "would fall
short of the true social loss occasioned by the accident."' 37 For closed public
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
Bussani, Economic Restatement, supranote 45, at 132.
Id.at 131.
Id.at 137.
Id.at 145.

137.

Id.at 145. Another economic analyst disagrees, however, finding social

losses too scant:
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environments and infrastructures, Bussani argues that allowing recovery gives too
much to plaintiffs and denying it gives too much to defendants; the proper rule
would fall somewhere in the middle. Because neither rule is perfect, Bussani feels
untroubled by the dominant rule of no liability.' 38 For flawed services, referring
generally to sloppy work by expert counselors, Bussani worries about third parties
enjoying a right to sue without paying for the generation of information. To avoid
this externality, he would recognize claims only from those whom the transaction
was intended to benefit. 3 9
The Bussani taxonomy stops here, and so views from law and economics
on the other causes of action we have considered will have to come from more
diffuse sources. An extensive literature on the law and economics of intellectual
property finds value in copyrights and trademarks but takes no unitary position (6
la Bussani) on whether liability should be augmented, reduced, or maintained at
current levels.140 Writings on the law and economics of making spoliation
actionable in tort appear limited to one article,' 4 1 which concludes that the answer
is uncertain; the author does insist that actionable spoliation must be either
intentional or in breach of "a legal or contractual
duty to preserve evidence which
' 42
is relevant to the potential civil action.'
2. The Scorecard
From the case law, the claim that "efficiency" explains various judicial
choices, both pro and con, on recovery for economic loss appears exaggerated.
Bussani professes to be indifferent to the rule on transferred loss: Any rule will
suit, so long as the tortfeasor becomes liable to someone. But it is far from clear
that the alternative plaintiff can sue when by the happenstance of a contract or "the
Economic losses consequent upon a negligent interruption in the supply
of a public utility should similarly be irrecoverable. Loss of profits is
usually a mere transfer of wealth. Expenditures that are intended to
prevent the loss of profits are either inefficient expenses or are too small
to justify the administrative costs of tort liability. Any payment by the
halted manufacturer to its employees during the interruption is a wealth
transfer: the latter are getting paid without having to work.
Perry, supra note 116, at 783.
138.
Bussani, Economic Restatement, supra note 45, at 149-50.
139.
Id. at 151.
140.
In 2002 Wendy Gordon published a short essay surveying two decades of her
own work on the law and economics of copyright questions, particularly fair use, which
makes a good introductory text. Wendy J. Gordon, The "Market Failure" and Intellectual
Property:A Response to ProfessorLunney, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1031 (2002). For a defense of
trademarks, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 303 (1987), which argues that robust trademark
protection improves both the quality of trademarks and the quality of goods.
141.
Terry R. Spencer, Do Not Fold Spindle or Mutilate: The Trend Towards
Recognition of Spoliation as a Separate Tort, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 37 (1993). Chris William
Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, 53 DuKE L.J. 1214, 1280-83 (2004), touches lightly on

nearby ground when refusing to lament the choice of most courts to reject this tort. See id. at
1317 (stating that the law has opted "for high sanctions rather than likely detection").
142.
Spencer, supra note 141, at 53.
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law itself' she experiences no loss. The Bussani rationale does a good job
explaining what it calls the "loss of a star" cases, an easy category wherein most
courts agree that a professional sports organization cannot recover for lost ticket
sales against a tortfeasor who injures the crowd-drawing athlete on its payroll. It
also works to explain European-style pay continuation liability. But the fish
Bussani shoots in this barrel are small. Injured superstars and pay continuation
statutes seldom turn up in American case law, and even in the European tradition
in which the Bussani analysis is based, transferred loss arises more often in the
context of leased and chartered assets, and there, Bussani cannot write a cogent
rule.
For utility claims, Bussani thinks that denying recovery would undercount
social losses. Most courts nevertheless deny recovery. Are judges thumbing their
noses at efficiency? Bussani presses on: "If liability is avoided in those cases"-yes, liability is indeed avoided--"it is most likely because of concerns for openended liability and not for efficient incentive considerations.' ' 143 This nimble
version of economic analysis takes ownership of stances that come out its way and
then backflips to disclaim responsibility for stances that don't: When a rule is not
congruent with efficiency, "it is most likely" that something other than efficiency
is going on. Indeed. 144
On closures and evacuations, Bussani acknowledges a bind. Closures
seldom generate much social loss, but they always generate some. "A private
economic loss of one party would not generate a social loss of equal magnitude,
145
unless we consider the purely abstract case of a perfectly inelastic market.'
Therefore neither a no-liability rule nor a rule allowing recovery would align with
efficiency, although the no-liability rule comes closer. Bussani puts this one in his
Win column: The rule of no recovery is "driven by implicit efficiency
considerations."'146 It helps to throw on the scale some ever-helpful anxiety about
"the administrative costs of implementing a full liability system"147-tort recovery
is never free, after all. It would be more accurate to say that for cases involving
closures, no rule can achieve an efficient result.
For flawed services, Bussani would recognize claims by intended
beneficiaries and not the general public. This outcome lands solidly in his Win
column. Few states take a contrary position, and Restatement (Second) of Torts is
in accord.
As for the claims that Bussani does not discuss, including wrongful death,
spoliation, defamation, and intellectual property, economic analysts have not
ventured to say much about how cases should come out. Copyright and trademark
are especially indeterminate, as was mentioned.148 As a recent paper notes, the
tricky balance for copyright is to "stop deterring innovators, and permit cost143.

Bussani, Economic Restatement, supranote 45, at 145.

See generally Bernstein, Whatever Happened, supra note 40, at 306-07
144.
(accusing law and economics of a tendency to overcount its victories).
145.

Bussani, Economic Restatement, supranote 45, at 148-49.

146.
147.
148.

Id. at 149.
Id.
See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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effective enforcement of copyright."' 49 This recommendation is reminiscent of the
counsel that Satchel Paige gave to baseball pitchers: Throw strikes.150 Chris
Sanchirico takes a position consistent with most of the case law on spoliation. 51
As both competitor and judge in this exercise, I ought to be generous to a rival, and
so will assign all this miscellany to the law and economics Win column.
To compare the explanatory power of law and economics accounts with
the account of Keep It Simple, however, we must return to the topics contained in
Bussani, as this work is the only writing in law and economics that builds a wide
taxonomy and then purports to identify whether liability or no liability is efficient.
The two explanations account equally well for one major category, flawed
services. But Keep It Simple fares better overall. It rejects liability for transferred
loss, as do the courts, whereas Bussani can recommend only "agnosticism." For
utility cases, Bussani's preferred rule of liability is contrary to what courts
reach, 152 whereas Keep It Simple aligns with the case law. Keep It Simple is
congruent with decisional law also on closures and evacuations, and its
ambivalence about unsatisfactory buildings that happen to be homes also comports
with how courts rule.
B. Keep It Simple vs. The FloodgatesExplanation
The exercise just undertaken with respect to law and economicsexplanation first, scorecard second-is harder to do here, because the claim is
harder to articulate. Adherents do not come together in an academic movement;
most of them do not use the metaphor "floodgates," which I have chosen only for
shorthand's sake. 153 Nevertheless, some variation on floodgates is probably the
most widely shared understanding of why American tort law rejects claims for
economic loss, and so it needs an airing in any presentation of a differing account.
1. The Explanation
The floodgates rationale offers no topic-by-topic analysis like Bussani's,
just a stance: Because economic loss does not have the same inherent connection
Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright
149.
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Sch. of Law, Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 025; Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Public Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper No. 63; 2004), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=525662.
150.
"Throw strikes. Home plate don't move." The Official Satchel Paige Quote
Page, http://www.satchelpaige.com/quote2.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2006). In fairness to
Lemley and Reese, I acknowledge that I have pulled their phrase out of context: Their paper
does make specific recommendations, focusing on the incentives that potential litigants
face.
See supra notes 79-84.
151.
But see supra note 136 (noting that Bussani is not speaking for all of law and
152.
economics on this point).
Writings on the floodgates rationale include Rabin, supra note 12, and Jane
153.
Stapleton, Duty of Care and Economic Loss: A Wider Agenda, 107 L.Q. REv. 249 (1991).
See also Bernstein, Representational Dialectic, supra note 1, at 342 n.233 (citing other
sources).
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to physical consequences that accompany personal injury and property damage,
commentators have deemed it more dependent on the judiciary for the drawing of
lines. Unless tort law can distinguish categorically between good and bad
economic loss claims, courts will impose "liability in an indeterminate amount for
an indeterminate 55time to an indeterminate class." '1 54 Indeterminancy means
excessive liability.'
2. Commentary and Scorecard
Is that so? How much is much? "The floodgates" may be a popular
rationale in part because it is malleable; consumers of the theory can opt for either
flexibility or rigor. In its soft form the floodgates resembles proximate cause,
where the defendant's lapse is unquestioned but the consequences of the lapse
deemed too remote for judicial redress. Some of James Gordley's account of the
economic loss rule can be read in this light. 156 From that point Gordley takes the
rule, and prefers not
necessary next step: He denies that the economic loss rule is a 57
to generalize about what courts do with economic loss claims.'
In this soft form the floodgates metaphor cannot be interrogated or tested.
Injuries gain redress if they are not too remote. Observers determine what is too
remote by looking at what courts refuse to redress; judges determine what is too
remote to redress by applying the economic loss rule. Q.E.D. Rather than rejoin
the ancient debate over whether "duty" is, or should be, less question-begging than
the foreseeability of proximate cause, 158 I will conclude this summary of the soft
form with the remark that it does not predict or explain much.' 59

154.

Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441,444 (N.Y. 1931).

As Rudolf von lhering thundered in 1861,
Where would it lead if everyone could be sued, not only for intentional
wrongdoing (dolus) but for gross negligence (culpa lata) absent a
contractual relationship? An ill-advised statement, a rumor passed on, a
false report, bad advice . . . and so forth-in short, anything and
everything would make one liable to compensate for the damage that
ensued ....
GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 27, at 271.
GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 27; James Gordley, The Rule Against
156.
Recovery in Negligence for Pure Economic Loss: A Historical Accident?, in PURE
ECONOMIC Loss IN EUROPE 25 (Mauro Bussani & Vernon Valentine Palmer eds., 2003)
[hereinafter Gordley, Historical Accident]. Gordley adds normative arguments that I put
aside because this Article is concerned only with descriptions of the economic loss rule. See
GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 27, at 281 (arguing that a pro-plaintiff approach would
"redistribute resources to those holding forms of property and engaged in activities that are
more likely to result in accidents").
Gordley, Historical Accident, supra note 156; GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS,
157.
supra note 27, at 280-84 (presenting instead a general "rationale for limiting liability in
tort" for economic loss that coexists with equally cogent rationales for not limiting it).
Gordley does join law and economics and Keep It Simple in approving claims by thirdparty beneficiaries for negligently prepared financial information. Id. at 282-83.
See Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REv.
158.
1014, 1021 (1928) ("When we say in a particular case that.., defendant was under a duty
...this but means that we have already passed judgment."); William L. Prosser, Palsgraf
155.
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A hard form is possible, although it appears to be absent in the literature.
Rejecting open-ended responsibility for negligently inflicted economic loss, the
"floodgates" perspective implicitly seeks to constrain liability through whatever
bright-line rules may be fashioned on principled bases. Committed to keeping the
set of good claims bounded and determinate, this approach has a natural fondness
for privity-like boundaries. It would hew to the preference for contract reasoning
that Keep It Simple favors, but in a more restrictive manner: The sympathetic
indulgence of human (as compared to business-entity) plaintiffs would not appear
here, and the floodgates approach would be troubled even by relatively narrow
exceptions to privity like the "intent to benefit third parties" rationale of the second
Restatement. 160 Consistent with.Keep It Simple, but contrary to law and economics
according to Bussani and his co-authors, it would reject liability for utility
interruptions. It might or might not allow plaintiffs deprived of a fish or seafood
catch to recover for despoliation of a marine environment. It would presumably
find actio personalis mortir cum persona more attractive than its statutory

replacement.1 61 It would have no problem recognizing recovery for copyright and
trademark infringement.
Unlike the soft form of the floodgates explanation, the hard form is
amenable to a scorecard, and we see that Keep It Simple outperforms its challenger
once again. In his article about the floodgates--or what he called a "pragmatic"
account of the economic loss rule-Fleming James acknowledged that courts
disallow claims "to which the pragmatic objection has no valid application.', 162 He
gave as examples two transferred-loss problems: the first involving a plaintiff shipcharterer who cannot recover for the lost time value consumed by repairs
occasioned by the defendant's negligence, and the second a pay-continuation
obligation. In both these cases, James pointed out, the obligation is just as finite
and well-delineated as it would be in a lawsuit by the more primary plaintiff, the
ship owner or the employee himself. 163 Bussani makes the same point when saying
that fears of "open-ended litigation" cannot explain a key European result: About
half the European nations they study allow plaintiffs to recover in the utility cases,
but almost none permit recovery for "loss of a star," even though the former

Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1, 15 (1953) ("Does the railroad, then, owe a duty to Mrs.
Palsgraf not to injure her in this way? Why, yes, if the court finds that it does. There is no

other answer."). For a critical review of this "duty-skepticism," see John C.P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1733, 1758 (1998).
159.
1 have little patience for explanations that persist even though they explain
very little. See Bernstein, Whatever Happened,supra note 40, at 315, 329, 331 (criticizing
law and economics for its tautologies); Anita Bernstein, The Communities That Make
Standards of Care Possible, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 735, 750 (2002) (faulting the resort to
"administrative convenience" as an account of what courts do).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1965).
160.
No "floodgates" writer has ever said that, as far as I know; but letting heirs
161.
seek recovery for a wrongful death seems decidedly more unbounded, and less predictable,
than killing off the action along with the decedent. See DOBBS, supra note 18, at 807-15

(summarizing the doctrinal complications that follow acceptance of this cause of action).
James, supra note 26, at 55-56.
162.
163.

Id.at 56-57.
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category is much more open-ended than the latter. 164 Thus on transferred loss, pay
continuation, and "loss of a star," then, this rationale does not align well with case
65
outcomes. If "the floodgates" does indeed disapprove of wrongful death claims,'
then it compares poorly with Keep It Simple,66which would support every state's
current rejection of a harsh common law rule.1
More generally, pervasive breadth in other types of tort claims challenges
the floodgates rationale. The rationale overlooks the staggering number of human
beings who can be physically injured by one product, 167 and the comparable
breadth of property at risk from tortious conduct. ("Even before the awful potential
of atomic energy was understood, man had witnessed such terrible urban
conflagrations as the London and Chicago fires.', 68 ) Though compatible with tort
reform, whose adherents wax endlessly about unpredictability (especially when
discussing medical malpractice claims and damages for nonpecuniary loss), the
rationale conflicts with the expansive pro-plaintiff developments of the midtwentieth century through the 1970s-the retreat of immunities, expanded liability
for failure to warn, the Rowland v. Christian merger69 of status categories for
visitors to land-that to a great extent remain good law. 1
C. Categories Where Keep It Simple Has No Ready Answer
As was noted, our Keep It Simple factfinder has mixed feelings about
lawsuits resulting from unsatisfactory buildings in which plaintiffs live. Her
preference for contracts impels her to side with defendants here: Plaintiffs might
have mitigated their losses in advance, yet they chose not to protect themselves.
Her other analytic devices, however-references to emotions found in the natal
family and a visual orientation-push in the other direction. This ambivalence
shows up poorly, one must admit, on a scorecard. Having faulted Bussani for his
"agnosticism" on transferred losses, 170 I must also fault Keep It Simple in the
category of unsatisfactory buildings.

164.
Bussani, Economic Restatement, supra note 45, at 144. Echoing James,
Bussani adds that a foreseeability rationale cannot explain the economic loss rule, because
economic loss cases do not differ much from "a typical tort situation" on this criterion. Id.at
124.
165.
See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
166.
DOBBS, supra note 18, at 804. Keep It Simple would also agree with the law
of almost every state that wives and husbands are entitled to damages for loss of consortium

when their spouses are severely injured. It is also receptive to extending consortium to the
parent-child relationship in death cases, but that point is beyond the scope of this Article:
parents in the contemporary United States do not generally have an economic expectancy in
the lives of their children, and the economic expectancy that children have in the lives of
their parents is covered under wrongful death.
167.
Silverstein, supra note 12, at 417 ("[T]here is simply no limit on potential
damage awards for mass torts like improperly produced, tested, marketed, or implanted
asbestos, cigarettes, silicon breast enhancers, or birth control devices.").
168.
James, supra note 26, at 50.
169.

(2002).
170.

LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 349-76

See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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Consistent with Keep It Simple, however, courts sometimes treat
properties that people live in differently from commercial buildings or properties
that developers hold for short-term investment. A leading case, Casa Clara
Condominium Association, Inc. v. Charley Troppino & Sons, Inc.,"17I rejected a
homeowner's claim against a subcontractor for the harms caused by bad concrete.
The harsh decision-plaintiffs had no other remedy to supplement their economic
loss claim172-has won acceptance in most courts; among those who reject it,
however, the status of plaintiffs as homeowners has been controlling.' 73 Partial
credit here for Keep It Simple.
As was mentioned, Keep It Simple would honor claims for lost profits by
commercial fishers following the closure of marine environments. 174 The
factfinder would not be able to deal confidently with claims related to recreational
fishing; 175 the visual image for the recreation version is not very different from the
livelihood kind. Keep It Simple would likely regard both classes of fishing
plaintiffs as having been harmed, but might disfavor the recreational claims based
on an inability to estimate the plaintiffs' losses. The two rival explanations, both of
them confident that recreational-fisher plaintiffs should be turned away, line up
with case outcomes here somewhat better than Keep It Simple.
IV. BEYOND SIMPLE: NONRIVALROUS ACCOUNTS OF THE
ECONOMIC Loss RULE
Among rationales for the economic loss rule, Keep It Simple is clearly
contrary to the two discussed in the last Part, while occupying a somewhat
different relation to others. This Part looks at some accounts of the rule that have
received relatively scant attention in decisional law and do not appear in Professor
Gergen's summary of explanations for the no-recovery rule. As I characterize
these accounts, they complete the thesis by helping to explain the appeal of
simplicity when it is experts, elites, and professionals who create no-duty rules.
They are not rival theses to Keep It Simple, because they do not attempt to predict
how cases will come out.

171.
620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993).
172.
Id. at 1248 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173.
See, e.g., Aas v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 581 (Ct. App. 1998)
(concluding, after a multi-factor balancing test, that contractor and subcontractors had a
duty to homeowners), aff'd, 12 P.3d 1125 (Cal. 2000); Yacht Club II Homeowners Ass'n,
Inc. v. A.C. Excavating, 94 P.3d 1177, 1181 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003) (criticizing Casa Clara
Condominium Association to hold that "subcontractors owe homeowners a duty of care").
174.
See supra Part III.C.
175.
Case law is divided. Compare Louisiana ex rel Guste v. M/V Testbank, 524
F. Supp. 1170, 1174 (E.D. La. 1981) (holding that only commercial fishermen, not
recreational fishermen, could recover), aff'd, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985), with Pruitt v.
Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978 (E.D. Va. 1981) (allowing the claim of
recreational-fisher plaintiffs). Courts appear to prefer the rule that allows only commercial
plaintiffs to recover.
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A. No Recovery Meets the Market: Perry and Silverstein
In separate writings, Stephen Perry and Eileen Silverstein propose
different versions of a thesis that tort law denies recovery because economic losses
attributable to negligence too closely resemble the economic losses that capitalism
condones and takes for granted. "Consider the following fact situation," writes
Perry. "A driver carelessly damages a public bridge in an accident, as a result of
which the bridge is closed for a period and the custom at a nearby tavern is
reduced."' 176 One could invoke foreseeability to hold the driver liable for this
economic loss, he continues. He then says why Anglo-American negligence law
does not do so:
[A person] could intentionally reduce the tavern's custom, thereby
causing exactly the same type and amount of economic loss, without
penalty or liability. He could, for example, set up a competing
establishment, even if his motive was to drive the tavern owner out
of business. He could, if he was a striking employee, set up a picket
line outside. Or he could mount a boycott of the tavern because, say,
it was only accessible by car and he wanted to discourage drinking
and driving. Given the pervasive vulnerability of the tavern owner's
economic interest, it is difficult to see how protecting
it against
77
general negligent interference could be justified.
In other words, economic loss differs from physical injury and property damage
with respect to background conditions that the system condones. It is seldom all
right to hurt another person's body or property, but it is often just fine to obstruct
the economic interests of another person, even intentionally, along the lines that
the tavern 178example suggests. Perry calls economic interests "inherently
vulnerable."'
Several years later, Eileen Silverstein (without citing Perry), emphasized
that this vulnerability is not inherent or apolitical. The economic loss rule, she
says, softens "the rough edges of capitalism by truncating inquiry."' 179 Whereas the
illustrations of lawful economic interference that Perry gathers avoid ideologyPerry's threesome consists of a predator hellbent on vicious competition, a worker
on a picket line, and a MADDish activist-Silverstein by contrast used an
ideological illustration: Lynn LoPucki's much-discussed analysis of the corporate
form as a shield against liability. 8 ° A business can bifurcate its asset-holding and
liability-generating functions through "strategic preparation" that shuffles
corporate assets out of a liability-generating shell company that will be judgment
176.
Perry, supra note 25, at 265. The illustration is based on a Canadian case
called Star Village Tavern v. Nield, [1976] 6 W.W.R. 80. Id. at 265 n.62.
177.
Perry, supra note 25, at 265-66. Perry also notes that "the relatively free
dissemination of information that takes place in liberal societies means that a person's
economic interests can suffer, sometimes as the result of a specific intention to harm,
because someone publishes negative consumer reports about his products ..... Id. at 264.
178.
Id. at 267.
179.
Silverstein, supra note 12, at 432.
180.
Id. (citing Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1
(1998)).
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proof before claimants can seek compensation for their harms.1 81 The preparation,
though choreographed, stays hidden from view: It looks like "the result of
financial reversals" that nobody intended, LoPucki wrote,18 2 and so corporate
bankruptcy made a transition from "a stigmatizing
event in 1980 to 'an acceptable,
' 83
trendy reorganizing tool' in the early 1990s."'
This view of the economic loss rule sees the denial of recovery as useful
to a falsely rosy dogma. "Market ideology tells us that if we work hard we will
have economic security,"' 4 writes Silverstein, and that what appear to be setbacks
or defeats are actually instances of strength, for other economic actors if not the
downtrodden themselves. Negligently inflicted economic loss refutes this merry
promise; making it actionable would teach people "that economic vulnerability is
only one accident away. Even further, recovery for pure economic injury would
call attention to the dangers of material insecurity in an economy that denies the
ability of the market
operating in the normal course of business to cause serious
185
financial injury."'
The simplicity thesis is compatible with the references Perry and
Silverstein make to the market, as well as their suggestion that North American
liability rules reflect the capitalist economy in which they were written. My lateteen construct is not the same person from culture to culture. Under hypothetical
political-economic conditions that are more protective, paternalistic, or overtly
beneficent than those prevailing now in the United States (while retaining the
American tradition of pursuing compensation for injury through tort litigation), the
backdrop of "contract" would vary. Perhaps our factfinder would take a socialwelfare contract for granted and find an entitlement to compensation in tort
whenever anyone suffered injury. The visual backdrop
could change too, because
86
culture influences what a human being can see.'
B. Formalismand History: Benson and Gordley
Other explanations of the economic loss rule also present no conflict with
Keep It Simple and help to account for its durability. Peter Benson offers a
formalistic rationale, in the vernacular of property: He argues that because the
economic-loss plaintiff has brought a claim based on an "interest falling short of a
proprietary or a possessory right," her injury is necessarily more attenuated than
that of a plaintiff who claims harm to her person or property.18 7 This plaintiff
181.

Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106

182.

Id.

183.
184.
185.
186.

Silverstein, supra note 12, at 432.
Id. at 437.
Id.
See generally ANNA GRIMSHAW &

AMANDA

YALE

L.J. 1, 53-54 (1998).

RAVETZ, INTRODUCTION TO

3 (Anna Grimshaw & Amanda Ravetz eds., 2005) (describing
shared agendas of anthropologists and "visual practitioners"). A San Francisco museum, the
acclaimed Exploratorium, investigates relations between perception and culture, beginning
with an epigraph: "We don't see things as they are; we see things as we are." The
Exploratorium, Introduction, http://www.exploratorium.edu/seeing/about/introduction.html
(visited Oct. 30, 2006).
187.
Benson, supra note 48, at 434.
VISUALIZING ANTHROPOLOGY
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"seeks protection of an interest in the use of something from which he has no right
to exclude the defendant."' 188 The defendant's behavior constitutes at most
"nonfeasance," which to Benson resembles "withholding a benefit," a condition
89
that cannot give rise to liability.
James Gordley makes the provocative suggestion that, at least in
Germany and England, the economic loss rule may have arisen by what he calls "a
historical accident."' 190 Drafters of the German Civil Code reviewed doctrine and
cases to write a definition of "unlawful" conduct that excluded economic
consequences, probably unintentionally. In England a rule of no recovery for
economic expectancy emerged in the treatises at the turn of the twentieth century
based on a misreading of the leading decisions, and from there became ingrained.
Rather than maintain an unsound so-called economic loss rule, Gordley suggests,
judges should write more carefully about duty (that is, to focus on the
responsibility to exercise due care or not, rather than on the consequences of
lapses) and proximate cause.
At first blush the Gordley prescription may appear contrary to Keep It
Simple: I have tried to account for a pattern that Gordley has deemed undeserving
of its own label. But the two theses coexist in harmony. Referring to a lateadolescent "factfinder," Keep It Simple downplays, as does Gordley, the
"ruleness" of the economic loss rule.
CONCLUSION
The difficulty that plaintiffs face when they seek redress in court for
economic losses attributable to negligence is much too provocative and important
to warrant its continuing residence in "a backwater."' 9' Economic loss is a
category of encyclopedic breadth within Torts. Because business entities as well as
human beings can experience economic loss, the number of potential litigants and
the dollar value of damages that could be alleged are both larger than their
counterparts in personal-injury litigation. In their refusal to hear most claims of
negligence whose consequences are only monetary, American courts have kept out
of view an enormous quantity of real harm.
Economic loss deserves more attention from scholars in particular as
respite from the hundred years' war that has riven Torts in the United States.' 92 For
decades, many commentators and participants have cast their lot with either
defendants or plaintiffs in the politicized battleground of tort reform, where tort
theory and principled doctrine cannot thrive.' 93 Before despairing of the possibility
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
at 435.
Id.
at 448.
See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 96.

192.

Andrew Blum, The Hundred Years' (Tort) War, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 15, 1990,

193.

See Anita Bernstein, Muss es Sein? Not Necessarily, Says Tort Law, 67 LAW
(2004):

Gordley, HistoricalAccident, supra note 156.

at 1.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 7

One cohort thinks of tort litigation as David aiming his slingshot at
Goliath's infinite greed and rapacity; another coins such phrases about
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of separating law from politics, we might wish for a torts world where businesscorporation plaintiffs sue human defendants for negligence,' 94 left-wing or
progressive ideology can be invoked to both favor and oppose liability,' 95 and a
pro-defendant "no duty" rule can support the liberal value of free speech. Theory
and principle do well in a world where the harms of negligence are experienced
bloodlessly, without physical pain or human plaintiffs who are in court only
because they cannot otherwise afford the medical care they need.1 9 6 Economic loss
offers such a realm for study.
My own study has led to Keep It Simple, a descriptive thesis about the
approach American courts take to claims for economic loss. Keep It Simple
explains many patterns in case law. It does not account for every holding of every
case, or even every pattern-but it does a better job of explanation 98than its
rivals,' 97 and comports well with other descriptive writing on the subject.
Like other commentary on the economic loss rule that purports to be
descriptive, Keep It Simple contains a little bit of argument. Robust normative
work has filled this Conference, and just a few pages away from this Article, Judge
Posner seeks to identify "the best rule of law for the 'economic torts'."' 199 I have
eschewed such a search here, presenting Keep It Simple almost entirely to talk
about how cases do come out rather than how they should come out. But I close
this Article appreciative of the "conventional morality," 200 respect for emotions
and the hearth, and even the visual orientation that our protagonist brings to a
subset of negligence cases. She often reaches the right answers for the right
reasons. Her ordinary humanity gives at least a valuable supplement, if not a better
injustice as "the tort tax," and "the lawsuit lottery," argues that bloated
transaction costs enrich lawyers and bureaucracies, and laments the loss
of playgrounds and obstetricians-literally "motherhood issues," as one
political scientist calls them, with "equity, efficiency, security, and
liberty" at stake.
194.
E.g., Phoenix Prof'I Hockey Club v. Hirmer, 502 P.2d 164 (Ariz. 1972);
Byrd v. English, 43 S.E. 419 (Ga. 1903).
195.
CompareAbel, supra note 14 (arguing that actions for negligence should be
limited to human beings alleging personal injury), with Silverstein, supra note 12

(suggesting that the economic loss rule, by denying the reality of wrongful financial harm,
promotes neoliberal ideology).
196.
Most of my taxonomy, see supra Part I, fits this bill, the exceptions being
wrongful death and perhaps damage to homes. Other economic-loss taxonomies, see supra
notes 39-43 and accompanying text, are even freer of human pain and suffering.
197.
See supraPart III.
198.
See supra Part IV.
199.
Richard A. Posner, Common-Law Economic Torts: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 48 ARIZ. L. REv. 735 (2006).
200.
1 checked Lexis and Westlaw for law review articles with this phrase in their
title, and found two. Both used the phrase pejoratively. Lindsay Brooke King, Note,
Enforcing Conventional Morality Through Taxation?: Determining the Excludability of
Employer-ProvidedDomestic PartnerHealth Benefits UnderSections 105(b) and 106 of the

Internal Revenue Code, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 301 (1996) (condemning American tax
law for favoring conventional coupling); Wojciech Sadurski, Conventional Morality and
Judicial Standards, 73 VA. L. REv. 339, 342 (1987) (claiming that "judicial recourse to
conventional morality" is futile).
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alternative, to the sweeping prescriptions that "efficiency" or rigid no-duty rules
would impose.2°'

201.
In his discussion of economic loss cases Judge Posner gives an example that
revisits the comparison between law and economics and Keep It Simple. See supra
Part III.A. He mentions the problem of a pre-employment drug test whose false-positive
conclusion, attributed to negligence in the administration of the test, results in the loss of a
job. See Posner, supra note 199, at 742. Posner would allow the employee a claim on
efficiency grounds: The employer does not have an adequate incentive to monitor the
performance of its laboratory, and so "the principal victim and therefore logical enforcer of
the lab's duty of due care is the employee." Id. at 743. Keep It Simple's teenager, familiar
with the unfairness of false accusations that carry penalties, would also favor the claim,
perceiving the injury as an indignity. It seems to me that Keep It Simple outperforms its law
and economics rival here not on alignment with case law (which Posner notes is divided; no
alignment can occur) but on the question of remedy. Posner does not say what damages this
victim should receive (the value of the lost job, even though the plaintiff might not have
won it even without the false-positive test result? lost wages, adjusted for wages received? a
deterrence-focused penalty not tailored to the injury?). Keep It Simple maintains focus on
an affront. Affronts may be hard to price, but at least the loss being compensated remains in
view.

